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First Amendment interests in both speech and religion often collide 
with one another.  A political activist claims a free speech interest in the 
right to purchase advertising time on a television network, while the net-
work claims a free speech interest in its decision not to sell the time.  A 
religious enclave claims a free exercise interest in having a dedicated 
public school district, while its neighbors claim a nonestablishment inter-
est in the government’s not extending the group special treatment.  In this 
article Professor Magarian examines the phenomenon of colliding First 
Amendment interests, explains and critiques the Supreme Court’s failure 
to acknowledge and resolve First Amendment collisions, and proposes a 
new theoretical basis for resolving them: participation enhancing review.  
The article first catalogues Supreme Court cases that involve colliding 
First Amendment interests, including expressive access, religious ac-
commodation, and religious speech disputes.  The Court avoids confront-
ing First Amendment collisions through two techniques: denial that one 
or the other interest exists or matters, and deference to elected officials’ 
balancing of the competing interests.  The Court’s approach embodies a 
strong posture of judicial neutrality, based on the concern that substan-
tive resolution of First Amendment collisions would interfere with elected 
officials’ policymaking discretion.  Professor Magarian contends that the 
Court disserves democracy when it abrogates its duty to construe and 
enforce the critical protections of the First Amendment.  He proposes 
substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions under the theory of 
participation enhancing review, a variation on the familiar theory of rep-
resentation reinforcing review.  Representation reinforcement theory 
roots judicial enforcement of constitutional rights in democratic princi-
ples.  Representation reinforcement, however, cannot justify substantive 
resolution of First Amendment collisions, because the theory rests on a 
formal account of democratic participation that does not encompass First 
Amendment collisions.  Participation enhancing review, in contrast, rests 
on a substantive account of democratic participation, which would com-
mit First Amendment doctrine to protecting the inclusive and informa-
tional attributes of democratic discourse.  Such an approach would lead 
courts, in analyzing First Amendment collisions, to emphasize the distinc-
tive value for democracy of expressive dissension and religious pluralism. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
The First Amendment imbues the Constitution with substantive de-
mocratic values.  The Free Speech Clause, along with the guarantees of 
press freedom and the right to petition for redress of grievances, posit 
open communication as central to our social and political order.  The Re-
ligion Clauses, with their intertwined commitments to free exercise and 
nonestablishment, make clear that religious toleration and governmental 
restraint in matters of conscience play a central role in the functioning of 
our constitutional system.  Beyond such general descriptions, determining 
the precise content of First Amendment values requires continual evalua-
tion and elaboration.  Judges and their critics often preoccupy themselves 
with the fear that judicial articulation and application of constitutional 
values might overwhelm the authority of democratically elected officials.  
John Hart Ely, critiquing and defending judicial review in Democracy 
and Distrust,2 sought to address that fear by conceptualizing judicial en-
forcement of constitutional rights as a procedural aid to a substantive vi-
sion of democracy.  Despite the influence of the theory Ely championed, 
First Amendment doctrine still reflects ingrained doubt that our democ-
ratic system can bear a robust regime of judicially enforced rights. 
In both the expressive and religious contexts, legal disputes fre-
quently arise that pit competing First Amendment interests against one 
another.  A political dissenter claims a First Amendment right of access 
to buy advertising time from a broadcaster, but the broadcaster responds 
by claiming a First Amendment right of autonomy to reject the dissenter’s 
ad.  A religious group claims a free exercise right to exemption from a 
generally applicable law, obedience of which would seriously compro-
mise the group’s religious prroseactices, but the government – or some 
objector with different religious commitments or none at all – responds 
that granting the exemption would violate the Establishment Clause.  
Sometimes expressive and religious currents cross, as when a religious 
speaker claims a free speech right to use government property or funding, 
but the government invokes the Establishment Clause to withhold the 
resource.  Collisions of First Amendment interests present courts with 
harder challenges than cases in which the government blatantly censors 
speech, or suppresses or advances a particular faith.  At the same time, all 
three sorts of collisions present especially pressing and important con-
flicts between interests central to individual conscience and participatory 
democracy.   
When the Supreme Court confronts colliding First Amendment inter-
ests – whether in the context of speech, religion, or both – it consistently 
avoids any substantive analysis of the collision.  Most commonly the 
Court refuses even to acknowledge conflicting claims of constitutional 
magnitude, instead denying salience to one of the competing First 
  
 2 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
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Amendment interests.  Thus, when dissident speakers seek access to ex-
pressive property, the Court routinely invokes a rigidly formalist version 
of the public-private distinction, or reduces speech protection to a simple 
matter of protecting the autonomy of powerful speakers, in order to reject 
any First Amendment right of access to means of expression.  When reli-
gious believers seek exemptions from burdensome laws, the Court has 
variously ignored the free exercise interest, the nonestablishment interest, 
or both.  Alternatively, when legislation empowers an expressive or reli-
gious interest the Court might otherwise ignore, the Court frequently de-
fers to legislative authority, thereby averting the need to make substantive 
judgments about the underlying constitutional interests.  In the Court’s 
most striking display of deference, it now treats both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause as virtually irrelevant to legislative 
exemptions for religious believers from the ordinary effects of legal rules.  
The hallmark of the Court’s approach to First Amendment collisions is an 
unwavering commitment to an ideal of judicial neutrality.  That commit-
ment embodies the Justices’ view that democratic principles compel re-
straint when First Amendment interests collide. 
This article contends that, when a case presents colliding First 
Amendment interests, democratic principles should lead the Court to pro-
vide an authoritative, substantive resolution of the conflict, choosing one 
competing First Amendment interest over the other in the circumstances 
of each case.  The Court’s insistence in matters of colliding expressive 
and religious interests on maintaining neutrality has deterred it from sub-
stantively resolving First Amendment collisions.  This article proposes an 
alternative, constitutionally grounded decisional value that would equip 
the Court to resolve collisions between expressive and/or religious 
claims: the advancement of participation in democratic self-government.  
Building upon Ely’s theory of representation reinforcing judicial review, 
which similarly attempts to justify judicial assertiveness within democ-
ratic principles, I label the proposed theory participation enhancing re-
view.  Where representation reinforcing review validates judicial repairs 
to the democratic process based on a formal value of political participa-
tion, participation enhancing review would validate substantive judicial 
resolution of First Amendment collisions under a substantive value of 
participation.  The substantive participation value embodies society’s 
collective interest in public discourse that is both informative and inclu-
sive, and it highlights the particular importance of dissent and difference 
for a healthy democratic system.  In collisions of expressive interests, the 
Court would favor outcomes that tended to expand the range of ideas pre-
sent and audible in public debate.  In collisions of religious interests, the 
Court would favor outcomes that maximized the capacities of different 
religious believers, and of nonbelievers, to participate in democratic dis-
course on a full and equal basis.  Participation enhancing review would 
not generate politically determined results, but it would ground resolution 
of First Amendment collisions in a broadly shared substantive value of 
democratic participation. 
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The article proceeds in two parts, the first descriptive and the second 
prescriptive.  Part I catalogues the broad and varied range of collisions 
between First Amendment interests and explains how the Supreme Court 
deals with them.  Through separately assessing expressive access cases, 
religious accommodation cases, and cases that pit expressive autonomy 
against nonestablishment interests, Part I generates novel insights about 
First Amendment doctrine.  The Justices avoid substantive resolution of 
First Amendment collisions through two complementary techniques: de-
nial, whereby the Court conceptualizes First Amendment collisions as 
presenting only one sort of constitutional interest; and deference, whereby 
the Court yields to legislative or regulatory resolutions of First Amend-
ment collisions.  Those two techniques, their proportions adjusted to suit 
the terrain on which each sort of collision occurs, characterize all three of 
these seemingly disparate lines of First Amendment decisions.  The case 
discussion in Part I is dense and detailed, because it documents compre-
hensively the important phenomenon of First Amendment collisions 
within and across the various fields of First Amendment doctrine. 
Part II criticizes the Court’s avoidance of First Amendment collisions 
and proposes the alternative of participation enhancing review.  The first 
section offers an explanation for the judicial avoidance of First Amend-
ment collisions documented in Part I.  It distills the idea of neutrality as 
the conceptual fuel that drives the Court’s practices of denial and defer-
ence, and it explains why the Court’s commitment to neutrality leads to 
inadequate decisions and normatively biased outcomes.  The second sec-
tion proposes the advancement of democratic participation as a substan-
tive, democratically legitimate basis for resolution of First Amendment 
collisions.  It first explains how the theory of representation reinforcing 
review, which rests on a formal account of democratic participation, pro-
vides a promising but ultimately insufficient template for adjudicating 
collisions of First Amendment interests.  It then introduces the substan-
tive participation value, which embodies the informative and inclusive 
dimensions of democratic participation, as the basis for participation en-
hancing review.  It describes the analytic inquiries participation enhanc-
ing review would require and addresses some likely criticisms.  Participa-
tion enhancing review would provide a democratically grounded frame-
work for ensuring that the First Amendment, authoritatively construed by 
courts, governs collisions of First Amendment interests. 
 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO RESOLVE 
COLLISIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS 
 
The Supreme Court, in the contexts of both expressive and religious 
freedom, has confronted important lines of cases in which parties on both 
sides could, and often do, coherently assert interests protected by the First 
Amendment.  This part identifies those lines of cases, analyzes the 
Court’s dispositions of them, and reveals the remarkably similar modes of 
analysis the Court brings to bear on all varieties of collisions between 
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First Amendment interests.  Although the discussion encompasses a great 
many decisions, I focus my analysis on the First Amendment collision 
each case presents, in order to provide a comprehensive catalogue of 
those collisions and to analyze the distinctive sort of difficulty in which 
they envelop the Court.  This exhaustive exercise is necessary both to 
substantiate the descriptive connections I draw among the various lines of 
First Amendment collision cases and to enable the diagnostic, critical, 
and prescriptive contentions I advance in Part II. 
The first section describes the several varieties of expressive access 
cases – property, media, campaign finance, and copyright disputes – 
which set interests in access to expressive property against the property 
owners’ expressive autonomy interests.  The second section describes the 
various permutations of religious accommodation cases, which set free 
exercise interests against nonestablishment interests.  The third section 
discusses a discrete line of religious speech cases, which set expressive 
interests against the Establishment Clause.  Although speech and religion 
doctrines present distinct problems, a common pattern emerges.  In all 
three settings, the Court shows great reluctance to recognize the presence 
of colliding First Amendment interests.  The Court routinely denies the 
existence, or the salience for a given dispute, of one competing interest.  
In certain cases, where a discretionary government regulation rather than 
a constitutional claim advances one of the competing interests, the Court 
defers to the elected branches, narrowing the scope of the other constitu-
tional interest enough to allow the regulation to stand.  The Court in ex-
pressive access cases most commonly engages in denial, while the ex-
plicit textual provenance of the competing interests in religious accom-
modation cases has led the Court to systematize deference, effectively 
deconstitutionalizing the question of religious accommodation.  A persis-
tent motif in the decisions is neutrality, which Part II will identify as the 
decisions’ methodological focus and attribute to the Justices’ subordina-
tion of substantive First Amendment analysis to judicial restraint. 
  
A. Conflicting Free Speech Claims: Access vs. Autonomy 
 
The paradigmatic free speech case involves censorship.  A private in-
dividual speaks; the government, threatened by or disapproving of the 
speech, attempts to silence and/or punish the speaker; the court, we hope, 
prevents the censorship unless the weightiest interest justifies it.  Begin-
ning in the late 1960s, however, the Supreme Court began to consider a 
different sort of First Amendment problem, one that highlighted the in-
creasing importance of expressive property – such as media outlets, shop-
ping centers, and political money – for effective participation in public 
debate.  These expressive access cases typically pit a would-be speaker’s 
interest in access to an important channel of communication against the 
channel owner’s expressive autonomy interest in excluding the speaker.  
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They present access claims similar to those that arise in public forum dis-
putes,3 but expressive access cases involve expressive resources con-
trolled by nominally private entities rather than the government and thus 
implicate the resource owners’ expressive autonomy. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, a succession of scholars set out argu-
ments for finding in the First Amendment a right of access to means of 
expression.4  Their arguments garnered early, tentative support on the 
Court.5  More recently, two distinct critiques of access rights have come 
to dominate academic debate.  Libertarians of both conservative and pro-
gressive stripes attack the idea of access rights as contrary to what they 
view as a constitutionally compelled distribution of expressive opportuni-
ties by economic markets.6  A second group of critics endorses the goal of 
broadening access to the means of expression through regulatory reform 
but rejects judicial invocation of the First Amendment to enhance access.7  
Advocacy of access rights, like any theory of expressive freedom, neces-
sarily entails a particular normative account of the First Amendment’s 
purpose and scope.  What access rights proponents and their critics share 
is an understanding that access and autonomy are distinct, internally co-
herent, normatively rooted free speech values whose tension requires sub-
stantive resolution. 
In contrast, the Court has avoided addressing the tension.  The Jus-
tices confront collisions between expressive access and autonomy inter-
ests in several important contexts – expressive property, the mass media, 
copyright, and money in politics – but each line of decisions generates the 
same narrative.  The Court most commonly denies putative speakers’ 
claims of access rights by presuming, with little or no explanation, that 
  
 3 Cf., e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 809-10 (1985) (rejecting political groups’ claims for access to a federal government 
fundraising drive based in part on government’s interest in choosing its preferred benefici-
aries).  In public forum cases, the government’s incapacity to claim constitutional rights, 
including expressive rights, submerges any conflict between expressive interests.  
 4 Important conceptualizations and defenses of expressive access rights include 
JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO MASS 
MEDIA (1973); OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY 
USES OF STATE POWER (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE 
SPEECH (1993); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to 
the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375; see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM (1948). 
 5 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding statutory 
provision for media access based on public’s interest in receiving information), discussed 
infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text; Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley 
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (finding constitutional right of access for expressive purposes to 
privately owned shopping center), discussed infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
 6 See Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the 
Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. [at 14-29] (forth-
coming 2007) [hereinafter Magarian, Access Rights] (describing and critically analyzing the 
libertarian critique of expressive access rights). 
 7 See id. at [29-50] (describing and critically analyzing the regulatory reform critique 
of access rights). 
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the First Amendment protects only expressive autonomy, not expressive 
access.  These cases employ a rigid version of the public-private distinc-
tion and an uncompromising notion of autonomy to reject access interests 
out of hand.  Where legislators or regulators enact access reforms, the 
Court narrowly defines aggrieved property owners’ expressive autonomy 
interests by reference to specific qualities of the expressive property at 
issue, thereby allowing the access reforms to stand as a matter of gov-
ernment discretion.  This move allows the Court to avoid any substantive 
explanation of how and to what extent expressive access interests, given 
legal force, challenge or complicate the primacy of expressive autonomy 
interests.8  
 
  1.  Claims for Access to Expressive Property 
 
The quintessential line of expressive access disputes involves claims 
for access to private property that has distinctive utility for expression.  
The earliest of these cases produced the Court’s only explicit holding that 
the First Amendment compels access to a privately owned channel of 
expression.  In Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza,9 the 
Court held that the First Amendment required a private shopping center to 
permit labor pickets, notwithstanding the owners’ property right to ex-
clude trespassers.  Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall placed 
workers’ First Amendment right to picket in the foreground of the case 
and treated their interest in access to the shopping center as a natural cor-
ollary to that right; in contrast, the decision treats the shopping center 
owners’ common law right to exclude the picketers as categorically sub-
ordinate to the First Amendment right.10  The opinion, however, relies 
heavily on direct connections between state power and the ostensibly pri-
vate autonomy rights at issue.  Justice Marshall – invoking Marsh v. Ala-
bama,11 in which the Court had rejected the efforts of a “company town” 
to restrict expressive activity – emphasized the heavily regulated charac-
ter of the shopping center and its functional identity with the traditional 
public square.12  Although Logan Valley Plaza boldly proclaimed the 
place of access rights in the First Amendment, the Court’s reasoning suf-
  
 8 Commentators on occasion have suggested that all free speech decisions implicate 
something like the expressive access problem.  See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free 
Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992) (characterizing free speech cases in general as shift-
ing costs from speakers to the public); R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as 
Hard (and as Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335 (2001) (arguing that most challenged 
speech regulations can be explained by reference to “free speech values”).  Only expressive 
access cases, however, involve direct collisions of free speech interests, and my analysis will 
demonstrate that the Court has found these cases distinctively impervious to substantive 
First Amendment analysis.   
 9 391 U.S. 308. 
 10 See id. at 313-15. 
 11 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
 12 See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 317-18 (emphasizing functional similarities between 
shopping center and Marsh company town). 
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fered from two glaring weaknesses.  First, reliance on the narrowly fo-
cused Marsh “public function” test left Logan Valley Plaza vulnerable to 
a more nuanced state action analysis.  Second, the Court’s easy dismissal 
of the shopping center owners’ common law property interest created an 
opening for future expressive property owners to cast their exclusionary 
claims in the stronger steel of expressive autonomy. 
The first of those weaknesses ensured the Logan Valley Plaza holding 
a short shelf life.  In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,13 the Court rejected a First 
Amendment claim brought by antiwar activists who sought to distribute 
handbills in a shopping mall adjacent to public streets.  Pivoting off the 
Logan Valley Plaza Court’s prominent invocation of Marsh, Justice Pow-
ell’s majority opinion technically limited Logan Valley Plaza to the spe-
cific context of picketing related to the property owner’s business in an 
isolated suburban area.14  In the decision’s key doctrinal move, however, 
Justice Powell denied that the activists had any First Amendment access 
right to counter the mall owners’ property right to exclude them.15   Sub-
sequently, in Hudgens v. NLRB,16 the Court acknowledged the primacy of 
the Lloyd Corp. Court’s constitutional analysis over its factual analysis 
and accordingly overruled Logan Valley Plaza.17  In doing so, the Court 
manifested its wholesale rejection of a First Amendment right of access 
to communicative channels: “[T]he constitutional guarantee of free ex-
pression has no part to play in a case such as this.”18  In rejecting Logan 
Valley Plaza, the Court emphatically affirmed the constitutional status of 
the shopping center owners’ autonomy interests – although not, at this 
stage, identifying those interests with the First Amendment – while cate-
gorically denigrating the putative speakers’ access interests.   
Subsequently, however, the Court rejected a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a discretionary regulation that gave speakers access to expressive 
property.  In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,19 the Court upheld 
the application of a provision of the California Constitution to allow a 
political group to solicit petition signatures in a privately owned shopping 
center – exactly the sort of access to which the Court had found no First 
Amendment right in Hudgens.  Exploiting the second weakness of Logan 
Valley Plaza, the PruneYard challenge notably framed the shopping cen-
ter owners’ interest in terms not only of property rights but also of the 
First Amendment right against compelled expression.  As to the owners’ 
  
 13 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
 14 See id. at 561-67 (detailing factual distinctions between Logan Valley Plaza and 
Marsh, on one hand, and Lloyd Corp., on the other). 
 15 See id. at 568 (“[T]his Court has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest 
may exercise general rights of free speech on property privately owned and used nondis-
criminatorily for private purposes only.”). 
 16 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
 17 See id. at 518-19. 
 18 Id. at 521. 
 19 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
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property claim, Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion found that the Cali-
fornia access provision fell short of a taking and therefore raised no con-
cern under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.20  The expressive 
autonomy claim presented a potentially thornier problem.  The Court in 
Lloyd Corp. and Hudgens had denied the salience of expressive access as 
a constitutional matter, but the California provision put expressive access 
back in play.  Had the PruneYard Court hewed to the prior decisions’ 
singular emphasis on expressive autonomy, it would have needed to con-
front the tension between access and autonomy interests.  Justice 
Rehnquist avoided that confrontation by holding that the shopping cen-
ter’s openness to the public and the lack of state direction behind the 
speakers’ message minimized the owners’ expressive autonomy interest.21  
The facts of this dispute therefore implicated no interest of constitutional 
magnitude, and the Court could defer to the authority of the state law.22  
The opinion failed to explain how those conditions were any less present 
in the prior shopping mall speech cases. 
The Court has continued to deny any First Amendment interest in ac-
cess to expressive property, and it has fortified property owners’ expres-
sive autonomy interests.  In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utili-
ties Commission,23 the Court struck down a state regulatory requirement 
that a public utility provide space in its monthly billing envelopes to con-
sumer advocates who opposed some of the utility’s policies.  Justice 
Powell’s plurality opinion began by emphasizing the public information 
value of the First Amendment, the central theoretical element in expres-
sive access claims, but he quickly repositioned that value to serve the 
utility’s expressive autonomy interest.24  The plurality treated the case as 
an instance of the government’s use of an access mandate to undermine a 
property owner’s expressive autonomy.25  The plurality distinguished 
PruneYard by asserting that the utility had a substantially greater expres-
sive autonomy interest at stake than had the shopping center owner,26 a 
position Justice Marshall echoed in his opinion concurring in the judg-
ment.27  The facts of the two cases arguably belie the distinction, but it 
demonstrates the Court’s increasing equation of property with speech.  
The plurality denied any possibility of a First Amendment access interest 
for the consumer advocates by equating access reforms with impermissi-
  
 20 See id. at 81. 
 21 See id. at 87. 
 22 Labeling PruneYard as a case of judicial deference to elected officials is technically 
inaccurate, as the “regulation” in PruneYard was a state constitutional provision as au-
thoritatively interpreted by the state Supreme Court.  See id. at 78.  No less than a statute 
or regulation, however, the object of the Court’s deference was a majoritarian source of legal 
authority.  
 23 475 U.S. 1 (1986). 
 24 See id. at 8-9. 
 25 See id. at 9-12. 
 26 See id. at 12. 
 27 See id. at 23-24 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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ble content-based restrictions on property owners’ expressive auton-
omy.28  Thus, Justice Powell managed to condemn an effort to balance 
public debate as “one-sidedness.”29 
Most recently, in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisex-
ual Association,30 the Court unanimously sustained a First Amendment 
challenge to a gay group’s invocation of a state antidiscrimination law to 
compel the group’s inclusion in a St. Patrick’s Day parade.  Hurley repre-
sents the apotheosis of the public-private distinction as a mechanism for 
elevating property owners’ expressive autonomy and denigrating dissi-
dent speakers’ interest in access to expressive property.  The parade or-
ganizers relied for their expressive opportunity on a parade permit that 
the state granted them as a matter of tradition and routine, as well as other 
state support and funding.31  Beyond banning the gay group, the organiz-
ers’ expressive boundaries for the parade were indiscriminate;32 in con-
trast, the gay group presented a focused message.33  Yet the Court cast the 
case as a straightforward instance of government encroachment – in the 
form of the gay group’s reliance on nondiscrimination law – on a private 
group’s “autonomy to control [its] own speech.”34  The Court implicated 
the gay group’s litigation strategy in this public-private alchemy by em-
phasizing that the group had foresworn any First Amendment claim.35  
That strategic mistake, however, hardly accounts for the Court’s whole-
sale transformation of a conflict between speakers into a linear narrative 
of government oppression.36  In particular, the Court went far out of its 
  
 28 See id. at 20. 
 29 Id. at 13. 
 30 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 31 See id. at 560-61.  The opinion states that “the city allowed the Council to use the 
city’s official seal, and provided printing services as well as direct funding” but somewhat 
cryptically notes that the organizers enjoyed those measures of direct support “[t]hrough 
1992” – the year before the specific events that gave rise to the case.  See id. at 561.  The 
Court’s implication that the parade enjoyed no direct government support in 1993 seems 
intended to buttress the parade’s private status.  But even aside from the Court’s opaque 
account of the facts, a momentary strategic shedding of government support should hardly 
alleviate concerns about the government’s role in a nominally private activity, especially 
when that government support has for many years strengthened the private activity’s fi-
nancial security and public legitimacy. 
 32 See id. at 562 (citing trial court’s factual findings). 
 33 See id. at 570. 
 34 Id. at 574. 
 35 See id. at 566. 
 36 The Hurley Court also explained its holding in terms of the parade organizers’ First 
Amendment right to expressive association.  See id. at 580-81.  Subsequently, the Court in 
Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), emphasized the same notion of expressive associa-
tion to block the application of a state’s nondiscrimination law to stop the Boy Scouts from 
expelling a gay scoutmaster.  Earlier expressive association cases had focused on protecting 
politically unpopular organizations from aggressive government demands for information.  
See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (invoking expressive association principle 
to bar Alabama from demanding civil rights organization’s membership list).  The expres-
sive association doctrine’s shift from a means of protecting political outliers to a means of 
sustaining politically powerful groups’ prerogatives parallels the Court’s elevation of ex-
 
10 
way to romanticize the expressive coherence of the polyglot parade37 and 
to inflate the danger that parade viewers would somehow attribute the gay 
group’s message to the parade organizers’ selective process38 – even 
though the organizers exercised little selective judgment about the pa-
rade’s content and even though most viewers would have had little reason 
to know who the organizers were.  The Court’s account of the public-
private distinction turned the gay group’s expressive interest into a disad-
vantage, because the group’s “public” status transformed its desire for 
expressive access into government coercion of the “private” parade or-
ganizers to deliver an undesired message. 
In its journey from Logan Valley Plaza to Hurley, the Court trans-
formed expressive property from a public resource that fosters dissident 
expression into a private preserve that the Constitution shields from dis-
sident expression.39  These cases depict the basic template for the Court’s 
approach to colliding First Amendment interests in every expressive and 
religious context.  The Court initially takes First Amendment access in-
terests very seriously.  In subsequent cases it reverses course, using the 
conceptual primacy of autonomy over access and/or the characterization 
of access interests as “public” regulatory affronts to deny the constitu-
tional grounding of access interests.  On the other side of the cases, the 
Court grants exclusive constitutional force to the autonomy interests, 
which it eventually characterizes as expressive, of property owners, 
whose “private” status secures their rights and relieves them of constitu-
tional obligations.   The Court constrains property owners’ autonomy 
interests by deferring to government access mandates in conceptually 
limited circumstances, averting the need to analyze the relative force of 
legally grounded expressive access and autonomy interests.  In none of 
the cases, despite their shifts in focus and outcome, does the Court 
squarely confront the existence of colliding First Amendment interests. 
 
  
pressive autonomy interests and rejection of expressive access interests. 
 37 See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 574 (“Rather like a composer, the Council selects the expres-
sive units of the parade from potential participants, and though the score may not produce 
a particularized message, each contingent’s expression in the Council’s eyes comports with 
what merits celebration on that day.”). 
 38 See id. at 575 (asserting that the gay group’s “participation would likely be per-
ceived as having resulted from the council’s customary determination about a unit admitted 
to the parade”). 
 39 Also arguably fitting under this expressive property rubric is a line of decisions in 
which the Court has protected political parties’ associational autonomy to restrict participa-
tion in primary elections against efforts to expand the class of eligible primary voters.  
Compare Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (rejecting voters’ First Amendment chal-
lenge to state’s restriction on eligibility to vote in primary) with California Democratic 
Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (sustaining parties’ First Amendment challenge to 
state’s expansion of eligibility to vote in primary).   Reinforcing the autonomy focus of those 
decisions, which primarily benefit the two major political parties, is the Court’s solicitude 
for state constraints on meaningful access to the political process for minor parties.  See, 
e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (rejecting minor party’s 
First Amendment challenge to state’s ban on fusion candidacies). 
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2.  Media Access Cases 
 
The most prominent line of expressive access disputes, closely paral-
leling the expressive property cases, has involved speakers’ efforts to 
gain access to the broadcast and electronic media.  In Red Lion Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC,40 the Court unanimously upheld the federal fairness 
doctrine, an administrative regulation that required broadcasters to pro-
vide a right of reply to anyone criticized over the airwaves, against a ra-
dio station’s First Amendment challenge.  Justice White’s opinion for the 
Court tacitly embraced the idea of a First Amendment access interest, 
stating that “[i]t is the right of the public to receive suitable access to so-
cial, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is 
crucial here”41 and condemning “private censorship.”42  The Red Lion 
Court, however, did not have occasion to impose any kind of constitu-
tional access mandate; it simply upheld regulations that provided ac-
cess.43  Thus, the Court’s only constitutional holding was that the circum-
stances of the broadcast industry limited the First Amendment’s protec-
tion of broadcasters’ expressive autonomy.  That holding rested on two 
interlaced features of broadcasting that justified regulation of the indus-
try.  First, Justice White suggested that the public’s interest in robust de-
bate animated the development of the airwaves and thus logically pre-
ceded broadcasters’ autonomy interest.44  Second, in an argument that 
echoes the direct attribution of private autonomy to state authority in 
Logan Valley Plaza,45 Justice White emphasized that scarcity in the 
broadcast spectrum rendered broadcasters’ property interests in their fre-
quencies contingent and ultimately controllable by the government.46 
A few years later, a pair of decisions exposed the weak underpinnings 
of Red Lion.  In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,47 the Court 
followed Lloyd Corp. in sealing any opening Red Lion might have created 
for finding a First Amendment right of access to the media.  The Democ-
ratic Party and a group of business executives opposed to the Vietnam 
War challenged broadcast networks’ bar against selling advertising time 
for political messages.  Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion empha-
sized that Congress and the Federal Communications Commission had 
  
 40 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 41 Id. at 390. 
 42 Id. at 392. 
 43 See id. (upholding right of reply regulations as not “inconsistent with the First 
Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of conducting its own affairs”). 
 44 See id. at 390 (“It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the 
broadcasters, which is paramount.”). 
 45 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
 46 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-89 (discussing scarcity rationale for broadcast regula-
tion). 
 47 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
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allowed the bar to stand, reflecting a federal policy of “permit[ting] pri-
vate broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic freedom consis-
tent with its public obligations.”48  In a key portion of the opinion that 
garnered only plurality support, Chief Justice Burger argued that the po-
litical activists had failed to make the showing of state action necessary 
for a First Amendment claim.49  His rigid application of the public-
private distinction discarded the activists’ interest in expressive access to 
focus completely on the broadcasters’ interest in expressive autonomy.  
Recognizing a right of access “in the name of the First Amendment would 
be a contradiction,”50 he asserted, because an access right would under-
mine broadcasters’ editorial discretion.  The majority further held, not-
withstanding the existing structure of broadcast regulation and the diffuse 
character of expressive access interests, that an access right would exces-
sively involve the government in determining the content of speech.51 
The following Term, the Court’s decision in Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Tornillo52 squarely rejected the notion of a First Amendment 
access interest while also limiting the Red Lion allowance for access 
regulation to the peculiar circumstances of the broadcast industry.  The 
Miami Herald Court struck down a state’s requirement that newspapers 
provide political candidates a right to reply to criticism.  Chief Justice 
Burger’s majority opinion, creating the model for the expressive property 
cases Pacific Gas and Hurley, categorically denied the existence of any 
First Amendment access interest, based upon the conviction that any gov-
ernment-mandated access reform would impermissibly undermine the 
core First Amendment value of expressive autonomy.53  The Court placed 
full constitutional emphasis on publishers’ expressive autonomy interest, 
manifest in their editorial discretion.54  The Court noted but disregarded 
the argument that newspapers, by virtue of economic conditions, pre-
sented barriers to entry tantamount to physical scarcity.55  Miami Herald 
thus left the Red Lion “technological scarcity” argument as a narrow, me-
dium-specific exception to the general rule of media corporations’ ex-
pressive autonomy. 
CBS, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission56 demonstrates the 
Court’s recourse to deference in the media access context.  Inverting the 
CBS v. DNC scenario, broadcasters brought a First Amendment challenge 
against an FCC regulation that required them to sell advertising time to 
political candidates.  Like the access mandate in PruneYard, the regula-
  
 48 Id. at 110. 
 49 See id. at 114-21 (plurality opinion). 
 50 Id. at 120-21 (plurality opinion). 
 51 See id. at 126-28. 
 52 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 53 See id. at 254. 
 54 See id. at 258. 
 55 See id. at 248-51 (discussing economic scarcity argument). 
 56 453 U.S. 367 (1981). 
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tion in CBS v. FCC circumvented the Court’s denial of a constitutional 
basis for expressive access interests, thereby seemingly compelling some 
substantive judicial analysis of the access-autonomy tension.  As in 
PruneYard, however, the Court managed to avoid the issue by purporting 
to focus on narrow features of the expressive property at issue.  The Jus-
tices rejected the argument that the FCC regulation impermissibly bur-
dened the broadcasters’ editorial discretion, concluding that the regula-
tion “makes a significant contribution to freedom of expression by en-
hancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, 
information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic proc-
ess.”57  The Court, however, emphasized that the regulations created only 
“a limited right to ‘reasonable’ access that pertains only to legally quali-
fied federal candidates,”58 and its acknowledgement of the regulation’s 
First Amendment value stopped far short of recognizing an actual First 
Amendment access right.  CBS v. FCC thus solidified the hybrid analysis 
the earlier media access cases had constructed.  As Red Lion had estab-
lished, the government could choose to impose broadcast access reforms 
in order to advance the public interest.  However, as CBS v. DNC had 
established, the government was under no First Amendment obligation to 
do so, and as Miami Herald had established, broadcast access reforms 
constituted a limited, medium-specific exception to the prevailing First 
Amendment concern for media owners’ expressive autonomy. 
The most recent electronic media access case once again upheld a 
federal access regulation but sharpened the Court’s emphasis on the con-
stitutional primacy of expressive autonomy.   In Turner Broadcasting 
System, Inc. v. FCC,59 the Court upheld federal “must-carry” rules that 
require cable television systems to allocate space in cable channel arrays 
to local broadcast stations.  The medium at issue in Turner, cable, was 
technologically distinct from broadcasting – and thus, like the newspaper 
in Miami Herald, not amenable to the Red Lion scarcity rationale.60   In 
addition, the government’s must-carry rules benefited a class of content 
providers rather than opening access for particular speakers.61  Based on 
these factors and a pointedly autonomy-focused statement of First 
Amendment principles,62 the Turner Court applied intermediate scrutiny 
to ensure that the government had a substantial reason for undermining 
cable systems’ expressive autonomy.63  The Court ultimately concluded 
  
 57 Id. at 396. 
 58 Id. 
 59 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II). 
 60 See Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994) (Turner I) (dis-
tinguishing Red Lion). 
 61 See id. at 643-52.  
 62 “At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should 
decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, 
and adherence.”  Id. at 641. 
 63 See id. at 661-64. 
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that the must-carry rules directly advanced several important federal in-
terests, including “promoting the widespread dissemination of informa-
tion from a multiplicity of sources.”64  The Court’s wariness of cable op-
erators’ power to close important channels of expression65 suggests an 
implicit awareness of access interests.  Neither of the Court’s opinions, 
however, locates access interests in the First Amendment or addresses the 
tension between expressive access and expressive autonomy interests.66  
Instead, the Court sounds a refrain of wary but necessary deference to 
congressional judgment.67  As in Red Lion and CBS v. FCC, but under 
more stringent review, the Turner Court allowed a limited and qualified 
exception to the First Amendment’s protection of expressive autonomy, 
based on special characteristics of the medium at issue. 
The media access cases almost exactly parallel the expressive prop-
erty cases.  After initially contemplating the free speech value of access 
interests, the Court categorically denies any First Amendment right of 
access to channels of communication while providing a strong right of 
autonomy for owners of communicative infrastructure.  Miami Herald, 
the print media cousin to the line of electronic media cases, affirms 
autonomy as the exclusive constitutional value in media access cases, 
failing to consider how an access interest grounded in the First Amend-
ment might, or might not, mitigate autonomy interests.  In the broadcast-
ing and cable contexts, the Court defers to legislative and regulatory ac-
cess mandates but – as in the expressive property analog, PruneYard – 
narrowly defines the boundaries in which that discretion applies.  In the 
media access cases, the Court once again avoids the complication of de-
termining how legally grounded expressive access interests should affect 
its analysis of expressive autonomy interests. 
 
3.  Copyright Disputes 
 
Copyright protection facilitates speech by preserving economic incen-
tives to create various kinds of expressive material.  At the same time, 
copyright protection suppresses speech by providing a legal basis to en-
join publications that infringe copyrights.68  In this article’s terms, the 
  
 64 Turner II, 520 U.S. at 189 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662). 
 65 See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 197 (“Cable operators thus exercise ‘control over most (if 
not all) of the television programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home [and] 
can thus silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.’”) (quoting 
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656). 
 66 The Court’s final decision in the Turner litigation followed an earlier decision that 
had determined the intermediate scrutiny standard and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.  See Turner I, 512 U.S. 622. 
 67 See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 196 (asserting heightened importance of deference to 
Congress “in cases, like this one, involving congressional judgments concerning regulatory 
schemes of inherent complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries 
undergoing rapid economic and technological change”). 
 68 See generally C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 891 (2002). 
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incentive to create embodies an autonomy interest, while the desire to use 
another’s intellectual property in one’s own expression embodies an ac-
cess interest.69  Unlike the other topics discussed in this section, copy-
right’s collision of First Amendment interests is complicated by a consti-
tutional provision outside the First Amendment.  The Copyright and Pat-
ent Clause authorizes Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science . . . 
by securing [to creators] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right to their 
. . . Writings.”70  The close chronology of the two provisions suggests that 
a proper reading should give meaningful effect to both. 
In a pair of decisions, however, the Justices have rebuffed efforts to 
place First Amendment limits on copyright.  Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises71 involved a dispute over the initial publication 
of excerpts from President Gerald R. Ford’s memoirs.  Ford’s publisher 
had sold Time the exclusive right to publish excerpts prior to the book’s 
release.  The Nation acquired an advance copy of the book and beat Time 
to the newsstand, leading Time to cancel its contract with the publisher.  
The Nation conceded that it had violated the copyright and that its publi-
cation fell outside the recognized boundaries of the “fair use” exception 
to copyright liability, but it contended that “First Amendment values” 
compelled a more generous construction of fair use for news reports on 
matters of public concern.72  The Court rejected that position out of hand.  
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion emphasized that “the Framers in-
tended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.”73  Accord-
ingly, the Court derided any notion of First Amendment limits on copy-
right, beyond the longstanding distinction between copyrightable expres-
sions and noncopyrightable ideas, as “fundamentally at odds with the 
scheme of copyright.”74   
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,75 creative users of copyrighted works that had 
passed into the public domain challenged Congress’ 20-year extension of 
the duration of copyrights as applied to works under copyright when it 
was enacted.  In addition to challenging the statute under the Copyright 
Clause, the plaintiffs contended that the extension, although content-
neutral, violated their expressive freedom.76  Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
  
 69 Rebecca Tushnet makes the inverse analogy: copyright represents a government 
policy of regulating speech – infringing uses – that would otherwise threaten to drown out 
the speech copyright protects.  See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech 
Law: What Copyright Has in Common With Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance 
Reform, and Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 35-37 (2000).  She thus 
compares copyright to regulations of broadcasting and political money, which I associate 
with access interests.  See id. at 60-67. 
 70 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 71 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 72 See id. at 555-56. 
 73 Id. at 558. 
 74 Id. at 559. 
 75 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 76 See id. at 193-94. 
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opinion echoed Harper and Row, characterizing the Copyright and Patent 
Clause as not merely compatible with but supportive of expressive free-
dom.77  The Eldred Court tacitly acknowledged the First Amendment 
authority for the plaintiffs’ challenge, creating an opening for a forthright 
analysis of the colliding autonomy and access interests.  Justice Ginsburg, 
however, sealed the opening, holding that, to whatever extent copyright 
restrictions implicated First Amendment concerns, “copyright’s built-in 
free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address them.”78  The 
safeguards she identified were the same statutory constraints on copyright 
discussed in Harper and Row: the expression-idea distinction and the fair 
use doctrine.79 
The speech-copyright decisions, like Lloyd Corp. and Miami Herald, 
deny the existence of a First Amendment interest in expressive access 
while holding that the First Amendment necessarily and exclusively pro-
tects expressive autonomy.  The Court’s equation of copyright with free 
speech, like its analysis in the recent expressive property cases, effec-
tively transforms a property interest into an expressive autonomy inter-
est.80  The copyright cases stack deference atop the denial, in that Con-
gress – by extending only a limited fair use exemption to copyright liabil-
ity in Harper and Row and extending the term of copyright protection in 
Eldred – has used its copyright power to advance expressive autonomy 
while constraining expressive access.  By the same token, the Court’s 
acknowledgement of the expression-idea distinction and the fair use doc-
trine roughly parallels its deference in PruneYard and CBS v. FCC to 
limited legislative or regulatory constraints on expressive autonomy.  
Rather than performing even a cursory analysis of how the First Amend-
ment’s protections constrain or shape congressional copyright authority, 
the Court simply reads the Copyright and Patent Clause as embodying the 
interest in expressive autonomy and subsuming the interest in expressive 
access.81 
 
4.  Campaign Finance Challenges 
 
The problem of campaign finance regulation presents a variation on 
the collision between expressive access and expressive autonomy inter-
ests.  Campaign finance limits do not provide putative speakers literal 
access to expressive property.  Instead, campaign finance limits constrain 
  
 77 See id. at 219 (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 
539 (1985)). 
 78 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. 
 79 See id. at 219-20. 
 80 See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text. 
 81 The Court’s strong pull toward deference in the copyright area – the one expressive 
access context that entails a conflict between two distinct provisions of the constitutional 
text – anticipates the Court’s ultimate arrival at an extremely deferential approach to the 
problem of religious accommodation, where textually grounded free exercise and nonestab-
lishment interests collide.  See infra notes 162-193 and accompanying text. 
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the use of expressive property in order, among other things, to alleviate 
economic disparities between unequally funded speakers’ capacities to 
participate in, and influence, political debate.82  The fundamental clash of 
expressive interests remains the same as in other expressive access cases: 
proponents of limits on political money seek to secure access for underfi-
nanced speakers to political discourse, while opponents seek to preserve 
the expressive autonomy of speakers who possess the means to spend 
money in the political process.  In this area the Supreme Court again has 
rejected the notion of a First Amendment access interest and has strongly 
vindicated the expressive autonomy of property holders – candidates and 
“independent” entities with enough money to influence electoral debate.  
To the extent the Court has allowed constraints on expressive autonomy, 
it has conceptually limited the range within which those constraints may 
operate and has left their definition to legislatures. 
The full narrative of the Court’s approach to colliding expressive in-
terests in the campaign finance context, from denial to deference, 
emerges from Buckley v. Valeo.83 Entities that wanted to contribute and 
spend money in political campaigns without any constraint challenged, as 
violations of their First Amendment autonomy interests, provisions of the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) amendments of 1974 that limited 
the amounts of money anyone could contribute to a federal campaign and 
the amounts candidates and independent entities could spend in the 
course of a campaign.  One theory of the provisions’ constitutionality was 
that finance regulations prevented moneyed interests in political cam-
paigns from silencing and marginalizing ordinary citizens of modest 
means – effectively an expressive access argument.  The Buckley Court 
struck down the FECA expenditure limits while upholding the contribu-
tion limits.  The Court’s distinction between expenditures and contribu-
tions turned on the different degrees of expressive autonomy it saw at 
stake.  Campaign expenditures, the Court explained, deserve the fullest 
degree of First Amendment protection because they allow speakers to 
inject expression directly into the electoral process.84  In contrast, cam-
paign contributions communicate the contributor’s support for a candi-
date or cause, but increasing the amount of a contribution adds only mar-
ginally to that message.85   
In striking down the various FECA expenditure limits, the Court once 
again denied the idea of a First Amendment access interest while locating 
  
 82 See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amend-
ment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609 (1982); see also Colorado 
Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“It is quite wrong to assume that the net effect of limits on contributions and 
expenditures – which tend to protect equal access to the political arena . . .  –  will be ad-
verse to the interest in informed debate protected by the First Amendment.”). 
 83 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 84 See id. at 19-20. 
 85 See id. at 20-22. 
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expressive autonomy at the heart of the First Amendment.  The Court 
dismissed the “equalization rationale” for campaign finance regulation – 
the contention that expenditure limits were necessary, or at least permis-
sible, to give people of lesser means a reasonable opportunity to influence 
political debate – by proclaiming that “the concept that government may 
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”86  The 
Court gave no consideration to the equalization rationale’s own speech-
protective underpinnings in a theory of access rights.  The Court’s denial 
of the access interest in campaign finance controls implicitly depended on 
rigid application of the public-private distinction.  The Court discerned no 
cognizable claim of right to campaign finance limits because it saw in the 
access provision only a governmental regulation and not the expressive 
interests the regulation served.  At the same time, the Court classified 
officeholders, office-seekers, and powerful political organizations as 
purely private rights-holders entitled to full expressive autonomy.  In let-
ting stand what it saw as the contribution limits’ lesser threat to expres-
sive autonomy, the Court – as in PruneYard and CBS v. FCC – deferred 
to Congress’ prioritization of expressive and regulatory values, albeit 
with only the prevention of corruption, and not the equalization of oppor-
tunities to influence political discourse, as an acceptable regulatory justi-
fication.87  Mirroring those other deferential cases, the Court’s peculiar 
explanation of campaign contributions’ lesser value for expressive auton-
omy ensured that its grounds for upholding the contribution limits would 
not translate into other areas of campaign finance regulation. 
On occasion the Court has suggested limits to the expressive auton-
omy inherent in political expenditures,88 while a recent decision held that 
even contribution limits can become unconstitutionally draconian.89  The 
essential structure of Buckley, however, has weathered three decades, and 
the Court has expressly reaffirmed the Buckley distinction between con-
stitutional approaches to expenditure and contribution limits.90  Although 
almost everyone finds that distinction doctrinally unpersuasive, norma-
tively undesirable, and/or practically pernicious,91 it makes perfect sense 
in the context of the Court’s other expressive access decisions.  Once 
again the Court strongly affirms the First Amendment primacy of the in-
terest in expressive autonomy; denies the idea of a competing First 
  
 86 Id. at 48-49. 
 87 See id. at 26-27 (accepting anticorruption rationale for contribution limits). 
 88 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding federal limits on expenditures 
of “soft money” and certain expenditures for issue advertisements); Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding ban on expenditures of corporate 
treasury funds in election campaigns). 
 89 See Randall v. Sorrell, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
 90 See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 91 See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, One Dollar – One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign 
Finance Reform, 37 WASH. L.J. 1, 29-30 (1997) (summarizing arguments against contribu-
tion-expenditure distinction). 
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Amendment interest in expressive access; and avoids confronting the sub-
stantive tension between access and autonomy interests by deferring to 
government access regulations in what the Justices portray as a conceptu-
ally limited sphere of diminished expressive autonomy.   
 
5.  The Press vs. Privacy: Bartnicki v. Vopper 
 
In one recent decision, the Court squarely acknowledged a conflict 
between First Amendment principles that correspond with access and 
autonomy interests.  Bartnicki v. Vopper92 presented the question whether 
the First Amendment protected a radio commentator’s broadcast of a sen-
sitive cellular telephone conversation – which the commentator had not 
himself intercepted but had reason to know had been intercepted unlaw-
fully – between the president of a teacher’s union and the union’s nego-
tiator in a highly contentious and well-publicized labor dispute.  Justice 
Stevens, writing for the majority, characterized the case as presenting “a 
conflict between interests of the highest order – on the one hand, the in-
terest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public 
issue, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more 
specifically, in fostering private speech.”93  Bartnicki did not involve the 
sort of straightforward access interest present in the expressive property, 
media access, and copyright cases, where putative speakers sought to use 
privately owned channels of communication to express their own mes-
sages.  Rather, like the campaign finance cases, Bartnicki involved dimi-
nution of one speaker’s expressive property – the personal privacy that 
fosters private speech – in order to enhance another speaker’s expressive 
opportunity.   In affirming the radio commentator’s constitutional immu-
nity from prosecution, the Court emphasized that “privacy concerns give 
way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”94 
The Bartnicki majority’s acknowledgement and resolution of the con-
flict between informational and privacy concerns amounts to the Court’s 
most thoughtful and candid analysis of the tension between expressive 
access and autonomy interests.  Even here, however, the discussion only 
scrapes the surface of the problem.  Justice Stevens’ elevation of speech 
about matters of public concern helpfully suggests a priority of First 
Amendment values.  His opinion, however, does not explain how the 
competing interests in the case – facilitation of private discussion and 
dissemination of information – serve that paramount value.  Instead, the 
opinion simply accords the informational interest a categorical trump 
over the privacy interest, thus effectively inverting but not deepening the 
typical public-private analysis of cases such as Hurley.  The opinion is 
  
 92 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 93 Id. at 518. 
 94 Id. at 534. 
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especially unsatisfying because the expressive privacy interest at issue in 
Bartnicki strikes closer to the integrity of natural persons, and thus argua-
bly carries greater weight, than the sorts of institutional expressive prop-
erty at issue in other expressive access disputes.  The opinion also fails to 
flesh out why and to what extent First Amendment doctrine should priori-
tize the dissemination of information about matters of public concern.  
Finally, the opinion does nothing to enhance the Court’s broader cogni-
zance of colliding First Amendment interests.  Rather than situating the 
case in the context of the many decisions that have ignored or dodged the 
presence of colliding speech interests, the Court treats Bartnicki as a sui 
generis dispute.95 
All of the Supreme Court’s expressive access decisions reveal a 
common analytic methodology for dealing with colliding First Amend-
ment interests.  The Court recognizes a strong free speech autonomy in-
terest.  It denies the notion of a free speech access interest as entirely out-
side the First Amendment, placing the potentially competing interests on 
opposite sides of the rigid public-private distinction and touting the con-
ceptual primacy of autonomy as a basis for First Amendment protection.  
On the infrequent occasions when the Court allows access interests to 
encroach on autonomy protections, it defers to the elected branches’ dis-
cretion, rather than invoking the First Amendment’s mandate, and limits 
the encroachment to narrowly defined conditions.  This combination of 
denial and deference allows the Court, in case after case, to avoid sub-
stantive consideration of the colliding First Amendment interests that 
expressive access cases present. 
 
B. The Free Exercise Clause vs. the Establishment Clause: Religious 
Accommodation Decisions 
 
The Supreme Court has confronted a substantial series of cases in 
which religious believers invoke the Free Exercise Clause to claim ex-
emptions from the application of generally applicable laws.96  These dis-
  
 95 Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Bartnicki provides a more extensive analysis 
than the majority’s of the First Amendment collision and connects the case with First 
Amendment collisions in the media access and campaign finance settings.  See id. at 536 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 
(2000) (Breyer, J., concurring); Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part)).  Justice Breyer, however, makes almost no effort to parse 
the underlying values at stake.  Instead, he suggests a vaguely formulated balancing of a 
statute’s “speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences,” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 
536, and then offers a balancing analysis that focuses on privacy expectations rather than 
speech interests.  See id. at 538-40.  Justice Breyer’s approach to the case reinforces the 
sense that the decision lacks broader applicability.  See id. at 540 (urging narrow reading of 
Court’s decision).  He also evokes PruneYard and CBS v. FCC by urging broad deference to 
legislative judgment.  See id. at 541 (“[W]e should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid con-
stitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility.”). 
 96 The chronological scope of my discussion begins with Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963), the first case to announce a robust doctrine of religious accommodation.  Earlier 
decisions that anticipated the accommodation issue include Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
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putes, known as religious accommodation cases, differ descriptively from 
cases in which religious believers invoke the Free Exercise Clause against 
instances of alleged religious discrimination.  The Court has made clear 
that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the government from going out of 
its way to target religious believers or institutions for special burdens.97  
Free Exercise accommodation cases pose a more conceptually challeng-
ing question: When must the government go out of its way to excuse reli-
gious believers from burdens applied generally to all citizens? 98  One 
complication in this analysis is that when government goes out of its way 
to confer a benefit on religion, it raises a concern under any forceful ac-
count of the Establishment Clause by according favorable treatment to 
religion or religious believers.99  Thus, religious accommodation cases set 
the Free Exercise Clause against the Establishment Clause. 
In the religious accommodation context, as in the expressive access 
context, the Court finds a way to avoid the collision of First Amendment 
interests.  The Court takes remarkably similar approaches in the two ar-
eas, once again employing in religious accommodation disputes the tech-
niques of denial and deference.  The principal difference is that the tex-
tual anchors of the competing Religion Clause interests render denial of 
either interest unsustainable.  Accordingly, the Court has opted to mar-
ginalize both free exercise and nonestablishment concerns in accommoda-
tion cases in an especially strong show of deference.  The Court lets both 
Religion Clauses operate within their separate spheres but abdicates to 
elected officials the responsibility for assessing the competing interests 
their collision in accommodation scenarios presents.  This section will 
discuss the Court’s approach to religious accommodation cases by fol-
lowing a spectrum from the cases in which the Court most clearly ac-
  
U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding application against Jehovah’s Witnesses of state prohibition on 
child labor they considered a religious obligation); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 
(1940) (striking down conviction of religious speaker for inciting breach of the peace under 
free speech and free exercise principles); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) 
(sustaining religious educators’ challenge to mandatory public education statute under due 
process and free exercise principles); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (uphold-
ing application against polygamous Mormon of federal bigamy prohibition). 
 97 See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).  Reli-
gious discrimination cases do not pit Free Exercise against Establishment Clause interests; 
if anything, government discrimination against one belief system may reflect favor for an-
other system and thus violate both First Amendment principles. 
 98 The issue of religious accommodation has inspired a formidable body of academic 
literature.  An excellent introduction is the nuanced debate between Ira C. Lupu, The Trou-
ble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 743 (1992), and Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
685 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Update]. 
 99 Elsewhere I have considered the issue of religious accommodations under a strongly 
separationist account of the Establishment Clause.  See Gregory P. Magarian, How To Ap-
ply the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Federal Law Without Violating the Constitu-
tion, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1903, 1970-72 (2001) [hereinafter Magarian, RFRA].  The analysis in 
this article comports with any Establishment Clause theory that takes seriously the possi-
bility that religious accommodations might undermine nonestablishment interests. 
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knowledges constitutional free exercise interests to present accommoda-
tion doctrine, which reduces the First Amendment to a virtual dead letter.  
 
1.  Mandatory Accommodation Cases 
 
Mandatory accommodation cases involve claims by religious believ-
ers that the Free Exercise Clause compels government to accommodate 
them by exempting them from laws of general application.  When the 
Court granted mandatory accommodations, it avoided analysis of the free 
exercise-nonestablishment collision by giving strong effect to the Free 
Exercise Clause while denying any meaningful effect to the Establish-
ment Clause.  When the Court struck down mandatory accommodations, 
it conversely gave strong effect to the Establishment Clause while deny-
ing any meaningful effect to the Free Exercise Clause.  The conceptual 
difficulty of denying effect to textually grounded constitutional provi-
sions, along with the practical difficulty of reconciling the results in vari-
ous successful and unsuccessful mandatory accommodation cases, may 
explain why the Court subsequently has employed an extreme brand of 
deference to nullify the doctrine of mandatory accommodation.100 
 
a.  Mandatory Accommodations Granted 
 
In a relatively narrow but important range of mandatory accommoda-
tion cases, the Court prior to 1990 held that the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired accommodations.  The leading decision was Sherbert v. Verner,101 
which barred a state from denying unemployment benefits to a worker 
who had refused a job on the ground that it would have required her to 
work on Saturdays, violating her Seventh Day Adventist convictions.  
The Court in Sherbert declared that it would apply strict scrutiny to man-
datory accommodation claims.102  Writing for the majority, Justice Bren-
nan purported to distinguish – but as Justice Stewart pointed out in his 
opinion concurring in the judgment,103 tacitly overruled – the Court’s 
recent decision in Braunfeld v. Brown,104 which had upheld a state’s man-
datory Sunday closing law against a free exercise challenge brought by 
orthodox Jewish merchants.  Braunfeld had justified the Sunday closing 
law as a mere “indirect burden”105 on the Jewish merchants’ observation 
of the Saturday Sabbath that advanced a substantial state interest in main-
taining a uniform day of rest.106  The Sherbert Court, in contrast, found 
the state’s more concrete interest in preventing fraud and abuse in the 
  
 100 See infra notes 162-193 and accompanying text. 
 101 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 102 See id. at 403. 
 103 See id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
 104 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 105 Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606. 
 106 Id. at 607. 
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unemployment compensation system insufficient to overcome the argua-
bly less direct burden that denial of unemployment compensation im-
posed on the Seventh Day Adventist’s religious observance.107  Justice 
Brennan acknowledged the potential Establishment Clause dimension of 
creating a special legal exemption for particular religious believers but 
shrugged off the problem.  The Court dryly noted that “plainly we are not 
fostering the ‘establishment’ of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in 
South Carolina”; rather, the Court was simply upholding “the governmen-
tal obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences.”108  Justice 
Stewart strongly criticized the majority’s failure to confront what he con-
sidered an undeniable collision between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Court’s Establishment Clause precedents.109 
The strict scrutiny standard Sherbert announced for mandatory ac-
commodation claims grew notoriously short legs.  The Court applied 
strict scrutiny to sustain mandatory accommodation claims in three sub-
sequent unemployment benefits cases – Thomas v. Review Board,110 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,111 and Frazee v. Illinois 
Department of Employment Security112 – that were materially indistin-
guishable from Sherbert.  Those decisions simply reiterated the Sherbert 
Court’s disavowal of any substantial tension between the Free Exercise 
Clause imperative to grant accommodation and the Establishment Clause 
imperative not to show special favor to religion.113  The only other case in 
which the Court mandated an accommodation was Wisconsin v. Yoder.114  
The Court there rejected Wisconsin’s attempt to enforce its compulsory 
student attendance law against members of the Old Order Amish religion.  
As befits an idiosyncratic decision, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the 
majority adopted a quirky tone of sentimental solicitude for the Amish 
way of life.115  Even so, the Court again justified its decision in terms of a 
  
 107 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-09. 
 108 Id. at 409.  The Court had just as easily dismissed the argument that the Sunday 
closing law upheld in Braunfeld violated the Establishment Clause.  See Two Guys From 
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961). 
 109 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 413-17 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result). 
 110 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 111 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
 112 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
 113 See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144-45 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409); Thomas, 450 
U.S. at 719-20 (same).  The Hobbie Court elaborated slightly on the Sherbert Court’s basis 
for ignoring Establishment Clause concerns, noting that “provision of unemployment bene-
fits to religious observers does not single out a particular class of such persons for favorable 
treatment and thereby have the effect of implicitly endorsing a particular religious belief.”  
Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11. 
 114 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 115 See, e.g., id. at 210 (explaining Amish communities’ objection to formal education in 
terms of “their devotion to a life in harmony with nature and the soil, as exemplified by the 
simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America during much of our early 
national life”). 
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“constitutional requirement of governmental neutrality”116 whose salience 
for the dispute the Court treated as self-evident.  As in Sherbert, the 
Court acknowledged “the danger that an exception from a general obliga-
tion of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establish-
ment Clause.”117  Once again, however, it dismissed that danger – without 
any further analysis – in order to pursue “the protection of values pro-
moted by the right of free exercise.”118 
These cases, in which the Court found compelling grounds to believe 
the Free Exercise Clause exempted religious believers from generally 
applicable legal obligations, provided ideal opportunities to explain how 
and why the particular free exercise interests at issue should trump the 
establishment concerns such exemptions raise.  The Court, however, 
passed up those opportunities, willfully ignoring the cases’ Establishment 
Clause dimensions.  In this respect, the successful mandatory accommo-
dation cases resemble such expressive access decisions as Lloyd Corp. 
and Miami Herald, in which the Court sustained expressive autonomy 
claims while rejecting out of hand any constitutional interest in expres-
sive access.  The text of the Religion Clauses precluded the Court in 
Sherbert and Yoder from directly following the course of those speech 
cases and denying outright the constitutional stature of the nonestablish-
ment interest.  The Court, however, could and did disavow any role for 
the Establishment Clause. 
 
b.  Mandatory Accommodations Denied 
 
Notwithstanding the strict scrutiny standard of Sherbert, the far more 
common result in mandatory accommodation cases was for the Court to 
deny the accommodation claims.  The Court used several different ana-
lytic techniques to reach these seemingly unlikely results, but in none of 
the decisions did it consider whether and to what extent the Establishment 
Clause placed constraints on the cognizable range of mandatory accom-
modations.  Instead, the Court simply deferred to discretionary govern-
ment decisions not to accommodate, effectively rendering both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause irrelevant. 
The Court ruled for the government in some mandatory accommoda-
tion cases by taking a restrictive view of what constituted a sufficiently 
weighty burden on free exercise to trigger the Sherbert strict scrutiny 
analysis.  In Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor,119 
the federal government sought to impose the minimum wage and record-
keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act on a religious 
foundation whose ministry to convicts and drug addicts included having 
them do unpaid work in the foundation’s commercial businesses.  The 
  
 116 Id. at 220. 
 117 Id. at 220-21. 
 118 Id. at 221. 
 119 471 U.S. 290 (1985). 
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foundation insisted that its specific method of dealing with its charges 
was integral to its religious mission, but the Court determined that the 
foundation could satisfy the Act consistently with its religious convic-
tions.120  While minimizing the claimants’ free exercise interest, Justice 
White’s majority opinion made no mention of the possibility that allow-
ing a religious organization’s commercial businesses to flout federal em-
ployment standards might violate the Establishment Clause.121  Similarly, 
a plurality in Bowen v. Roy122 all but mocked a Native American family’s 
free exercise claim that requiring them to furnish a social security number 
for their daughter in order to receive welfare benefits would compromise 
their spiritual control over their lives while completely ignoring the Es-
tablishment Clause as a potential ground for denying the claim.123 
In another group of cases, the Court found the government’s asserted 
regulatory interests sufficiently strong to overcome any burden the chal-
lenged government actions imposed on free exercise.  In United States v. 
Lee,124 Chief Justice Burger reached the apparent limits of his fondness 
for the Old Order Amish,125 writing a majority opinion that rejected an 
Amish employer’s argument that paying social security taxes would con-
tradict his religious duty to provide social relief independent of the gov-
ernment.  The Court found “the broad public interest in maintaining a 
sound tax system”126 too important to compromise in the name of reli-
gious freedom.  Bob Jones University v. United States127 found the Court 
sustaining the government’s denial of tax-exempt status to a university 
that engaged in religiously motivated racial discrimination.  Although 
acknowledging the burden that taxation would place on the school, the 
Court subordinated that burden to the government’s compelling interest in 
eradicating racial discrimination in education.128  In Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,129 the Court rejected an effort to 
block timber harvesting in a forest area that Native Americans used for 
religious rituals.  Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion declined even to 
apply strict scrutiny, holding that the requested accommodation would 
impermissibly interfere with the government’s conduct of its internal af-
  
 120 See id. at 303-05. 
 121 The opinion’s only Establishment Clause analysis was its rejection of the founda-
tion’s claim that the Act’s recordkeeping requirements would impermissibly entangle the 
government with religion.  See id. at 305-06. 
 122 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 123 See id. at 703-04 (plurality opinion). 
 124 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 125 Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed supra notes 114-118 and 
accompanying text. 
 126 Lee, 455 U.S. at 260. 
 127 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 128 See id. at 603-04. 
 129 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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fairs130 – an analysis the majority portion of the Court’s opinion in Bowen 
v. Roy had also applied to the government’s requirement that a Native 
American family maintain a social security number.131  At no point in 
rejecting any of these free exercise claims did the Court assess the possi-
ble import of the Establishment Clause for the requested accommoda-
tions. 
In a final set of cases, the Court determined that the government’s 
pressing need to control prison and military environments categorically 
precluded application of the Sherbert strict scrutiny standard to accom-
modation claims brought by prisoners and service members.  In O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz,132 the Court applied a deferential “reasonableness” 
standard of review to uphold federal prison policies that prevented Mus-
lim inmates from attending weekly Jumu’ah congregational services.  
Although the services represented a critical aspect of the Muslim prison-
ers’ religious obligations, the Court went out of its way “[t]o ensure that 
courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials” in connection with 
“evaluation of penological objectives.”133  Similarly, in Goldman v. 
Weinberger,134 the Court upheld the application of a military regulation to 
bar a Jewish officer in the Air Force from wearing a yarmulke while in 
uniform.  Once again the majority acknowledged the importance to the 
officer of his religious practice but focused its attention on the govern-
ment’s pressing institutional interests, emphasizing that “[o]ur review of 
military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more 
deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations de-
signed for civilian society.”135  Once again the Court gave no considera-
tion to the Establishment Clause as a reason to avoid special exemptions 
for religious believers.136 
All of these denials of mandatory accommodations provided a context 
in which the Court could have measured the requirements of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause against the limitations of the Establishment Clause.  The 
decisions, however, rejected the free exercise grounding of the accommo-
dation claims while ignoring any establishment concerns the accommoda-
tions might have raised.  The Sherbert mandate of strict scrutiny for free 
exercise accommodation claims renders both sides of that First Amend-
ment denial extremely puzzling.  On one hand, the Court seemingly 
  
 130 See id. at 447-50. 
 131 See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699-700. 
 132 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
 133 Id. at 349. 
 134 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
 135 Id. at 507. 
 136 Justice Stevens wrote separately in Goldman to emphasize “the interest in uniform 
treatment of all religious faiths.”  Id. at 512 (Stevens, J., concurring).  He maintained that, 
although a yarmulke may be an especially physically unobtrusive religious symbol, any 
attempt to make practical distinctions between accommodating a yarmulke and Rastafarian 
dreadlocks or a Sikh turban would impermissibly involve the government in religious dis-
tinctions.  See id. at 512-13. 
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should have taken the Free Exercise Clause more seriously as a source of 
accommodation claims.  On the other hand, the Establishment Clause 
could have – perhaps should have – provided the Court with a textually 
anchored constitutional counterweight to the Sherbert-fortified Free Ex-
ercise Clause in cases where granting an accommodation would have re-
quired the government to distribute an important prerogative inequitably 
between believers and nonbelievers.  Instead, however, the Court in these 
cases opted to imbue government regulatory interests with greater force 
than they have ever enjoyed in any other arena where the Court applies 
strict scrutiny, overwhelming the asserted free exercise interests while 
rendering establishment concerns irrelevant.  As such, these cases resem-
ble deferential free speech decisions such as PruneYard and CBS v. FCC, 
in which the Court subordinated a seemingly significant First Amendment 
interest not to a contrary First Amendment interest but rather to the gov-
ernment’s regulatory priorities.  
 
2.  Permissive Accommodation Cases 
 
In the permissive accommodation scenario, the government chooses 
to grant an accommodation to religious believers, and nonbeneficiaries 
challenge the grant under the Establishment Clause.  The Court’s use of 
denial and deference in these cases produced mixed outcomes prior to 
1990.  In the cases that upheld permissive accommodations against Estab-
lishment Clause challenges, the Court intimated connections between the 
accommodations and strong free exercise interests – but carefully avoided 
actual reliance on the Free Exercise Clause – while denying the salience 
of the claimed nonestablishment interests.  Conversely, in the cases that 
struck down permissive accommodations under the Establishment Clause, 
the Court denied the salience of the free exercise interests claimed to de-
fend the accommodations. 
 
a.  Permissive Accommodations Upheld 
 
In Walz v. Tax Commission,137 the Court upheld a New York City tax 
exemption for religious property, authorized by a state constitutional pro-
vision that preserved exemptions for property “used exclusively for reli-
gious, educational or charitable purposes.”138  Chief Justice Burger began 
his discussion with perhaps the Court’s most forthright acknowledgement 
of the tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 
“both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if ex-
panded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.”139  His 
prescription, however, was to find “play in the joints” between the two 
  
 137 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 138 Id. at 666 (quoting N.Y. CONST. Art. 16, § 1). 
 139 Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69. 
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clauses,140 and the analysis that followed ran headlong from the implica-
tions of both.  Religious accommodations, the Walz Court declared, re-
flect the inescapable truth that “[g]overnments have not always been tol-
erant of religious activity,”141 but the Free Exercise Clause itself man-
dates no more than “noninterference” with religion.142  On the other side, 
nonestablishment represents a serious constitutional policy with deep 
historical roots,143 but letting churches operate free of the obligations 
others must bear merely establishes a minimal level of “benevolent neu-
trality toward churches and religious exercise generally.”144  Walz vali-
dated substantial government financial accommodation of activities criti-
cal to many people’s religious worship.  Yet, according to the Supreme 
Court, the two constitutional provisions that speak directly to the delicate 
relationship between government and religion have nothing to do with 
that result. 
The Court in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos145 upheld 
the application to a church’s secular nonprofit activities of a federal law 
that exempted religious employers from prohibitions on religious em-
ployment discrimination.  The Court did not reach the question whether 
the Free Exercise Clause required the exemption,146 and Justice White’s 
majority opinion relied heavily on the Walz “play in the joints” formula-
tion to place any free exercise issue beside the point.147  The opinion did, 
however, identify the nondiscrimination law as potentially imposing “a 
significant burden on a religious organization.”148  That burden would 
appear to have been countered by a comparably significant establishment 
concern.  The claimed establishment in Walz had been a common, time-
tested benefit, enjoyed by educational and charitable institutions as well 
as churches and extracted almost imperceptibly from the mass of taxpay-
ers.  In contrast, Amos involved specific governmental authorization for 
churches, and only churches, to discriminate against individual employ-
ees.  Justice White, however, found the establishment concern trivial.  
Substantively, under the Lemon analysis,149 the statute had the “secular 
purpose” of “alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference with the 
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
  
 140 Id. at 669. 
 141 Id. at 673. 
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 143 See id. at 668 (discussing historical foundations of Establishment Clause). 
 144 Id. at 676-77. 
 145 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 146 See id. at 339 n.17. 
 147 See id. at 334 (employing Walz analysis of relationship between accommodation and 
Free Exercise Clause). 
 148 Id. at 336. 
 149 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (setting forth Establishment 
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have principal effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and not excessively entan-
gle government with religion). 
 Colliding First Amendment Interests 29 
missions.”150   
The decisions in Walz and Amos took care to maintain a squarely 
nonconstitutional basis for the religious accommodations they upheld, 
ensuring the primacy of legislative authority rather than any free exercise 
mandate.  At the same time, both decisions denied the establishment con-
cerns raised by government decisions to accommodate religion, placing 
seemingly pivotal decisions about tax benefits and employment discrimi-
nation outside the scope of the Establishment Clause.  These cases al-
lowed the government’s regulatory discretion to overcome the posited 
nonestablishment interests, just as the unsuccessful mandatory accommo-
dation cases allowed the government’s regulatory discretion to overcome 
the posited free exercise interests.  Both sets of cases, like PruneYard and 
CBS v. FCC in the speech context, marginalize one First Amendment 
interest while deferring to legislative decisions to advance the other. 
 
b.  Permissive Accommodations Struck Down 
 
The Court on occasion has struck down permissive accommodations 
under the Establishment Clause.  In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,151 the 
Court struck down a Connecticut statute that required all employers to 
relieve sabbatarians of work on their Sabbaths.  Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Burger emphasized the strictly religious character of the 
accommodation and noted that the statute imposed costs both on employ-
ers, who had to bear the burden of sabbatarian employees’ limited avail-
ability, and on nonsabbatarian employees, who both missed out on the 
statute’s benefit and had to compensate for its cost.152  Accordingly, the 
Court found that the statute lacked the secular purpose required under the 
Lemon Establishment Clause test.  Although observance of a Sabbath 
occupies a central place in many different religious traditions, the major-
ity made no mention of the Free Exercise Clause.  Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence explains the omission: the Court does not consider the Free 
Exercise Clause applicable to private employers.153  However, given the 
holding in Sherbert that states may not deny benefits to private sector 
employees fired for observing their Sabbaths,154 a decision that turns on 
the state’s power to mandate accommodation of sabbatarians by private 
sector employers would seem to implicate the Free Exercise Clause.  
Rather than assessing the competing First Amendment interests at stake 
in the Connecticut scheme, the Court simply left the free exercise interest 
  
 150 Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. 
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out of its analysis.155 
The Court achieved the same outcome by different means in Texas 
Monthly v. Bullock.156  That case, which struck down a state sales tax 
exemption for religious periodicals, yielded a splintered majority.  Justice 
Brennan, writing for a three-Justice plurality, emphasized that here, like 
in Thornton and unlike the superficially similar situation in Walz, only 
religious believers enjoyed the governmental benefit.157  Accordingly, the 
statute raised serious Establishment Clause concerns.  Unlike in Thorn-
ton, however, the exemption in Texas Monthly directly alleviated a bur-
den imposed by government.  Thus, the case squarely presented a com-
peting free exercise interest.  Even so, both the plurality and the principal 
concurrence found ways to ignore the conflict.  Justice Brennan dismissed 
the interest in tax-free publication as simply too remote from the core of 
religious belief and activity to animate a mandatory accommodation158 or, 
in the alternative, insufficiently weighty to overcome the government’s 
interest in uniform tax collection.159  Justice Blackmun’s opinion concur-
ring in the judgment purported to confront the collision between free ex-
ercise and nonestablishment interests, and he posited the solution of ex-
tending the exemption to nonreligious but comparably conscientious pub-
lications.160  Rather than substantiate and defend that alternative, how-
ever, he reverted to the theme of the Court’s occasional allowances for 
expressive access – judicial humility and deference to legislative discre-
tion, which in this case paradoxically required him to strike the statute 
down.161 
These cases might have provided occasions for considering whether 
the Free Exercise Clause required, or at least authorized, the challenged 
accommodations in a manner that might have countered or complicated 
the Court’s Establishment Clause analysis.  The Court, however, avoided 
any such juxtaposition of First Amendment interests.  Instead, inverting 
its reliance in Sherbert and Yoder on the Free Exercise Clause to exempt 
religious believers from legal obligations while denying the salience of 
the Establishment Clause, the Court in Thornton and Texas Monthly in-
  
 155 The Court reached a similar result in Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982), 
which struck down on Establishment Clause grounds a Massachusetts statute that allowed 
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voked the Establishment Clause to restore legal burdens on religious be-
lievers while denying the salience of the Free Exercise Clause.  Both sets 
of decisions echo speech cases such as Lloyd Corp. and Miami Herald, in 
which the Court denied the existence of a First Amendment right to ex-
pressive access.  As noted above in connection with the successful man-
datory accommodation cases, however, the shared textual pedigree of the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses undermines efforts to deny ei-
ther competing religious interest.  The Court has decisively addressed this 
problem by falling back hard on its other patented collision-avoiding 
technique: deference. 
 
3.  Employment Division v. Smith and Judicial Abstention from      
 Constitutional Questions of Religious Accommodation 
 
The religious accommodation landscape changed dramatically in 
1990 when the Court in Employment Division v. Smith162 effectively 
eliminated mandatory accommodations.  The Smith Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause rarely if ever compels government to provide reli-
gious accommodations.  At the same time, the Court encouraged legisla-
tors and regulators to accommodate religious interests where they deem 
accommodation appropriate, without regard to the Establishment Clause.  
Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause in accommodation disputes while 
ignoring the significance of the Establishment Clause allowed the Court 
to accelerate and perfect its move from the earlier cases that rejected 
mandatory accommodation claims, as well as those that upheld permis-
sive accommodations, to deconstitutionalize conflicts between the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. 
 
a.  The Smith Decision 
 
Smith involved a challenge by Native Americans to their denial of un-
employment benefits on the ground that they had been fired for cause.  
The plaintiffs’ employer, a drug treatment center, had fired them for us-
ing peyote, an illegal drug that their religion considered sacramental.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Smith has grown notorious for its 
doctrinal contortions in defense of his surprising declaration that “[w]e 
have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct the state is 
free to regulate.”163  The facts of Smith fell within the one line of manda-
tory accommodation decisions – the unemployment benefits cases – in 
which the Court had consistently applied strict scrutiny to require reli-
gious accommodations.164  Justice Scalia, however, neither followed that 
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line of decisions nor disavowed it.  Instead, he distinguished the earlier 
cases on the grounds that they had not involved violations of criminal 
law165 and had involved “a context that lent itself to individualized gov-
ernmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,”166 never 
explaining why either of those distinctions should make a difference.  The 
opinion distinguished Yoder and earlier decisions on the ground that they 
arose not just under the Free Exercise Clause but also under some other 
constitutional provision167 – thereby spawning the alchemical “hybrid 
rights” doctrine, which lower courts have spent fifteen futile years trying 
to render meaningful.168  These highly suspect distinctions allowed the 
Court to use Smith as a vehicle for denying the force of the Free Exercise 
Clause over the full range of religious accommodation claims. 
One might have expected the Court to explain such a sweeping dis-
avowal of free exercise accommodations, at least in part, by reference to 
the Establishment Clause.  Indeed, when he turned from the asserted lack 
of precedent for mandatory accommodations to affirmative problems with 
the doctrine, Justice Scalia spoke in terms that resonate vaguely with Es-
tablishment Clause concerns about accommodations: the danger of giving 
religious believers “a private right to ignore generally applicable laws”169 
and the fear of “a system in which each conscience is a law unto it-
self.”170  He hinted at a different sort of Establishment Clause concern in 
making the questionable assertion that mandatory accommodations re-
quired courts to make unsavory judgments about the “centrality” of par-
ticular religious practices.171  In the end, however, the Smith Court ori-
ented religious accommodation doctrine in the direction most fraught 
with establishment dangers.  Declaring that “[v]alues that are protected 
against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of 
Rights are not thereby banished from the political process,”172 Justice 
Scalia invited federal and state officials to dole out whatever religious 
exemptions might strike their political fancies, notwithstanding that 
“leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in.”173 
  
 165 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, 878. 
 166 Id. at 884. 
 167 See id. at 881-82. 
 168 See Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When a “Rule” Doesn’t Rule: The Failure of the 
Oregon Employment Division v. Smith “Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
573 (2003) (reviewing lower courts’ experience in applying hybrid rights doctrine and find-
ing doctrine ineffectual).  The practical failure of the hybrid rights doctrine confirms Mi-
chael McConnell’s early suggestion that “the notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the 
sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder . . . .”  Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revision-
ism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, 
Revisionism]. 
 169 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886. 
 170 Id. at 890. 
 171 See id. at 886-87. 
 172 Id. at 890. 
 173 Id.  
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b.  Permissive Accommodation After Smith 
 
Smith has had the predictable effects of clearing most religious ac-
commodation cases from the Court’s docket and ushering in a bonanza of 
discretionary religious accommodations.174  Congress responded to Smith 
by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),175 which 
sought to reimpose the Sherbert strict scrutiny standard for all mandatory 
accommodation claims.  Although the Court loudly struck down RFRA 
on federalism grounds in City of Boerne v. Flores,176 it recently made 
clear in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal177 
what Boerne implied by omission – that RFRA remains effective for 
claims against the federal government.178  Neither Boerne nor O Centro 
considered any implications of the Establishment Clause for RFRA’s 
broad mandate of discretionary accommodations.179  
Although Smith would appear to have cleared the accommodation 
field for more focused consideration of Establishment Clause limits on 
discretionary accommodations, the Court has taken up few such cases 
over the past fifteen years.  In Cutter v. Wilkinson180 the Justices unani-
mously rejected an extremely broad Establishment Clause argument that 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, a micro-RFRA 
that requires strict scrutiny of religious burdens on federal prisoners, was 
invalid on its face.  Echoing Amos, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion found that 
the Act merely “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on 
private religious exercise.”181  The only post-Smith case in which the 
Court has struck down a discretionary accommodation is Board of Educa-
tion of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,182 which rejected 
New York’s creation of a special school district for members of the Sat-
mar Hasidim.  Justice Souter’s majority opinion found that creating the 
special district extended beyond noninterference with religion to “single[] 
out a particular religious sect for special treatment,”183 thereby violating 
  
 174 See Diana B. Henriques, As Exemptions Grow, Religion Outweighs Regulation, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1. 
 175 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). 
 176 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 177 546 U.S. 418, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
 178 See Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. at 1220. 
 179 Justice Stevens, concurring in Boerne, would have struck down RFRA on its face as 
a violation of the Establishment Clause.  See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536-37 (Stevens, J., con-
curring).  Justice Stevens joined the unanimous O Centro opinion without writing sepa-
rately. 
 180 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 181 Id. at 720.  As in O Centro, Justice Stevens wrote no separate opinion in Cutter, 
declining another opportunity to press the Establishment Clause concern he voiced in his 
Boerne concurrence. 
 182 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
 183 Id. at 706 (footnote omitted). 
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the principle that “neutrality as among religions must be honored.”184  
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s vigorous dissent in Kiryas Joel,185 both 
that case and Cutter produced unremarkable outcomes.  The Court gener-
ally disdains the sort of facial challenge brought in Cutter.186  Kiryas Joel 
represents the Court’s clearest acknowledgement that favoritism toward 
even a minority religion can violate the Establishment Clause, but the 
unusual accommodation in that case implicated a core function of gov-
ernment more directly than the Sabbath relief of Thornton or the tax ex-
emption of Texas Monthly. 
The only other recent decision in which the Court credited nonestab-
lishment interests in the context of a free exercise claim was Locke v. 
Davey.187  In that case, a college student majoring in pastoral ministry 
argued that the state of Washington’s refusal to make devotional theology 
students eligible for a state scholarship program constituted discrimina-
tion against religion in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.  Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the student had not made 
the demanding showing required to establish free exercise discrimina-
tion.188  The Chief Justice split the Establishment Clause baby in an odd 
way.  Veering into dicta, the opinion declares that the Establishment 
Clause would not have barred extending the scholarship funds to devo-
tional study.189  Then, invoking the “play in the joints” formulation of 
Walz,190 the Court credits Washington’s explanation that it sought not to 
discriminate against religion but only to avoid violating the nonestab-
lishment requirement of the state Constitution, which imposes a stronger 
bar than the federal Establishment Clause against funding religion.191  In 
vindicating Washington’s position, the Court comes close to endorsing in 
principle the nonestablishment imperative to withhold state funds from 
ministerial studies.192  Despite its nuanced reasoning, Locke amounts to a 
predictable extension of Smith deference, rebuffing an effort to extend the 
zone of religious discrimination in which the Court gives meaningful ef-
fect to the Free Exercise Clause while taking pains to reiterate the Court’s 
narrow view of the Establishment Clause.193 
  
 184 Id. at 707 (citation omitted). 
 185 See id. at 732 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 186 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (holding that, for a facial 
challenge to succeed, “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists 
under which the [challenged regulation] would be valid”). 
 187 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
 188 See id. at 724. 
 189 See id. at 719. 
 190 See id. at 718 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970), discussed supra 
notes 137-144 and accompanying text). 
 191 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722-23. 
 192 See id. at 722 (“[W]e can think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment 
interests come more into play.”) (footnote omitted). 
 193 Justice Scalia, dissenting in Locke, provides a rare critique of the Court’s “play in 
the joints” approach to conflicts between the two religion clauses, calling it “not so much a 
legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing constitutional 
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Smith dramatically weakens the force of both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause in religious accommodation cases.  
The Smith Court openly reduced the Free Exercise Clause to a prohibition 
on deliberate discrimination against religion.  Although the Court barely 
mentioned the Establishment Clause and offered no new guidance for 
adjudicating permissive accommodation disputes, its enthusiastic chan-
neling of accommodation claims into the political process eviscerated the 
Establishment Clause as a check on permissive accommodations.  Smith 
averts the need to justify denying one or another First Amendment inter-
est in particular religious accommodation scenarios by categorically de-
nying the First Amendment’s salience for nearly all accommodation dis-
putes.  This strategy obviates any danger of a First Amendment collision 
involving the Free Exercise Clause and strongly decreases the likelihood 
that establishment concerns will pull the Court into substantive constitu-
tional analysis of religious accommodations.  
 
 C. The Free Speech Clause vs. the Establishment Clause: Religious 
Speakers’ Claims on Public Resources  
 
A distinct line of decisions involves a collision of First Amendment 
interests that crosses the median between expressive and religious inter-
ests.  In most of these cases, public educational institutions seek to deny 
otherwise generally available expressive resources to religious groups or 
speakers, based on the government’s asserted interest in avoiding viola-
tions of the Establishment Clause.  Widmar v. Vincent194 involved a uni-
versity’s denial of meeting space to a religious student group.  In Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,195 a school dis-
trict refused to let a church group use school property after hours for a 
film showing.  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia196 dealt with a university’s withholding of student activity funds 
from a religious publication.  In Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,197 a school district once again denied access to school property 
after hours for a religious function, this time for meetings of a religious 
children’s group.  In each case, the Court ruled in favor of the religious 
group.  The cases have played out over two decades, and the majority 
opinions employ somewhat varied reasoning, but the decisions make a 
consistent set of core points: school property made available for third 
parties’ use is a limited public forum;198 denying access specifically for 
  
directives.”  Id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia, however, views the two 
clauses as perfectly coordinated to “demand neutrality,” not as coming into any sort of con-
flict.  Id. 
 194 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
 195 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 196 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 197 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 198 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-93 (suggesting 
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religious speakers amounts to an impermissible viewpoint-based exclu-
sion;199 and government in these circumstances has no valid concern that 
opening the forum to religious expression would violate the Establish-
ment Clause.200  The Court followed identical reasoning to a similar re-
sult in Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,201 which 
found that the Free Speech Clause protected, and the Establishment 
Clause did not restrict, the Ku Klux Klan’s display of an unattended cross 
on state capitol grounds open to a variety of expression. 
The government’s role in these religious speech disputes distin-
guishes them from expressive access cases.  The public-private distinc-
tion has led the Court in public forum cases to find a limited First 
Amendment access right to public property, even as it has rejected the 
idea of an access right to private property.202  The public-private distinc-
tion also limits the government to pleading its regulatory prerogatives, as 
opposed to constitutional rights, in countering the First Amendment right 
of expressive access to public forums.  What distinguishes these religious 
speech disputes from ordinary public forum cases is that the government 
dons a constitutional cloak by invoking its responsibility to respect the 
Establishment Clause.  Thus, these cases present a distinctive instance of 
colliding First Amendment interests.  The religious speaker plaintiffs lit-
erally seek expressive access, but the public forum doctrine grants their 
interests the constitutional legitimacy that expressive access claims 
against private defendants, and also post-Smith free exercise accommoda-
tion claims, lack.  The government defendants, meanwhile, invoke the 
Establishment Clause to vindicate the people’s First Amendment interest 
in nonestablishment. 
The manifest necessity in the religious speech cases of analyzing the 
competing free speech and nonestablishment claims suggests that here, at 
last, the Justices must confront a collision of First Amendment interests.  
  
that school facilities might have been public forum but assuming arguendo that they were 
nonpublic forum); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106 (noting 
parties’ stipulation that school’s opening of facilities for after-hours meeting had created 
limited public forum). 
 199 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 (stating that university “discriminated against student 
groups based on their desire to use a generally open forum to engage in religious worship 
and discussion”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-32; Good 
News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-10. 
 200 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272-73 (concluding that university’s creation of a public 
forum could not violate Establishment Clause); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395-96 (same); 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839-40 (holding that inclusion of religious beneficiary in generally 
available funding scheme does not violate Establishment Clause); Good News Club, 533 
U.S. at 113-14 (holding that allowing religious group to meet on school property would pre-
sent no danger of endorsement of religion). 
 201 515 U.S. 753 (1995).  The majority portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Capitol 
Square followed Widmar and Lamb’s Chapel without much embellishment.  See id. at 757-
64.  The remainder of the opinion, which garnered only plurality support, sought to dis-
credit posited distinctions between the educational institution cases and the distinctive 
facts of Capitol Square.  See id. at 764-70 (plurality opinion). 
 202 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (distinguishing expressive access and pub-
lic forum disputes). 
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The decisions’ reasoning, however, finds a path to denial.  The notori-
ously elastic public forum doctrine allows the Court to treat these particu-
lar speakers’ interests not merely as constitutionally legitimate but rather 
as something akin to the robust interest in expressive autonomy.  The 
decisions portray the plaintiffs as seeking not special treatment but 
merely equal treatment,203 and they portray the government not merely as 
foreclosing opportunities but as censoring ideas.204  On the other hand, 
the decisions employ the anemic Establishment Clause rhetoric of suc-
cessful religious accommodation cases such as Sherbert and Walz, ubiqui-
tous after the Smith Court’s license for discretionary accommodations.  
Especially in the more recent religious speech decisions, the majority 
emphasizes that the Free Speech Clause compels the government to give 
religious entities whatever it gives otherwise comparable secular entities, 
characterizing governmental nonsupport of religious speech based on 
Establishment Clause concerns as a “heckler’s veto.”205  The principle 
that animates a more forceful account of the Establishment Clause – that 
governmental support of religion creates constitutionally cognizable haz-
ards – has faded out of the picture. 
The Court in the religious speech cases does not substantively assess 
the relative merits of the asserted free speech and nonestablishment inter-
ests.  Rather, it does exactly what it did in failed expressive access cases 
such as Lloyd Corp. and Miami Herald, the successful mandatory ac-
commodation cases Sherbert and Yoder, and the successful challenges to 
permissive accommodations in Thornton and Texas Monthly – wholly 
embraces one competing First Amendment interest while categorically 
denying the existence or salience of another.  The religious speech deci-
sions do not conclude that expressive autonomy interests, in the circum-
stances, outweigh nonestablishment interests.  Rather, they declare that 
government officials have blatantly violated expressive freedom and 
senselessly invoked the Establishment Clause where it has no proper ap-
plication.  These decisions reaffirm the Court’s general solicitude for ex-
pressive autonomy and general lack of anxiety that government estab-
lishes religion by assisting religious entities.  What they do not do, any 
more than the expressive access or religious accommodation decisions, is 
tell us anything about how the Court would decide a case in which it ac-
knowledged the presence of two colliding First Amendment interests. 
 
 
  
 203 See, e.g., Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 (“The University has opened its facilities for 
student groups, and the question is whether it can now exclude groups because of the con-
tent of their speech.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (stating that school district denied access 
for religious film showings “solely because the series dealt with the subject from a religious 
standpoint”). 
 205 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119 (stating that “[w]e decline to employ Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence using a modified heckler’s veto”). 
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II. RESOLVING FIRST AMENDMENT COLLISIONS UNDER 
PARTICIPATION ENHANCING REVIEW 
 
In the three seemingly disparate contexts of expressive access, reli-
gious accommodation, and religious speech decisions, the Supreme Court 
resorts to some combination of two techniques – denial of one of the 
competing interests and deference to elected decisionmakers – in order to 
avoid substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions.  The striking 
consistency in the Court’s approach indicates that these three categories 
of First Amendment collisions share some important, fundamental attrib-
utes.  Every First Amendment dispute, whether focused on speech, relig-
ion, or both, involves – at least in theory – fundamental issues of individ-
ual conscience.  The importance of those conscientious issues for shaping 
individuals’ participation in society means that every First Amendment 
dispute also affects the process of collective self-government that defines 
our democratic system.  Recognizing the stakes of First Amendment dis-
putes for democratic government helps to explain the Court’s use of de-
nial and deference to avoid substantive resolution of First Amendment 
collisions.  Where interests charged with democratic significance come 
into direct conflict, assertive judicial review may appear to encroach on 
the domain of democratic policymaking.   
The democratic salience of First Amendment collisions, however, un-
derscores the problem with the Court’s approach.  The First Amendment 
contributes substantially to the constitutional structure of our democracy, 
and any collision between structural elements creates the most pressing 
need for authoritative constitutional resolution.  Thus, the many important 
cases in which First Amendment interests collide should compel the 
Court to extricate itself from the tangled web of denial and deference and 
to embrace a mode of adjudication that allows the Justices to construe and 
enforce the First Amendment’s commands.  This part diagnoses the fail-
ings of the Court’s approach and proposes an alternative way to adjudi-
cate First Amendment collisions, based on a commitment to advancing 
participatory democracy.  Proceeding from John Hart Ely’s elaboration of 
representation reinforcing review – the most familiar justification for as-
sertive judicial enforcement of constitutional rights as an essential com-
ponent of our democratic system – I call the proposed alternative partici-
pation enhancing review. 
The first half of this part critically analyzes why the Court has consis-
tently met First Amendment collisions with the techniques of denial and 
deference that Part I describes.  The dominant theme in the expressive 
access, religious accommodation, and religious speech decisions alike is 
the need for the government to treat ideas and speakers, and faiths and 
believers, in a neutral manner.  By using denial and deference to enforce 
government neutrality, the Court ultimately seeks to maintain neutrality 
in its own decisions.  Denying the existence of First Amendment colli-
sions when possible, and deferring to elected decisionmakers when neces-
sary, avoids visible resort to the substantive values needed to choose one 
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First Amendment interest over another and thus precludes usurping de-
mocratically elected officials’ policymaking authority.  The Court’s reli-
ance on denial and deference, however, entails normatively charged base-
lines: in the speech cases, a formalistic conception of the public-private 
distinction and a rarefied ideal of autonomy; in the religion cases, a dis-
regard for the interests of minority religious believers and a strong toler-
ance for government favoritism toward religious interests.  The Court’s 
approach to these cases creates a false impression of neutrality in the 
name of democratic government, but the Court disserves our democratic 
system by failing to confront and apply the First Amendment principles 
that make that system work. 
A better approach to these important cases would forthrightly ac-
knowledge the presence of First Amendment collisions and assess them 
under an analytic method firmly grounded in democratic principles.  The 
second half of this part contends that the Court can choose between col-
liding First Amendment values, and justify its choices, by relying on a 
substantive conception of democratic participation.  Beginning from the 
familiar theory of representation reinforcing review, I explain how a fo-
cus on the informative and inclusive qualities of democratic participation 
provides a basis for the Court to make substantive constitutional judg-
ments about which of two colliding First Amendment interests should 
prevail in any given case.  The participation enhancing review that I pro-
pose would lead the Court to consider whether granting a putative speaker 
access to expressive property would enhance or diminish the quality of 
public debate, and whether exempting a religious believer from a legal 
obligation would advance or retard the vitality of democratic discourse.  
In practice, these inquiries would favor dissenting and minority perspec-
tives, whatever their substantive viewpoints, in speech and religion.  If 
the Court justified its choices between First Amendment interests in terms 
of facilitating and advancing people’s capacity to participate meaning-
fully in democratic processes, most people, most of the time, would con-
sider the Court’s grounds for decision democratically legitimate, and the 
Court would satisfy its obligation to implement the First Amendment in 
cases that raise profound constitutional issues about speech and religion. 
 
A.  Neutrality as the Supreme Court’s Conceptual Basis for Refusing  
 to Confront First Amendment Conflicts 
 
In every sort of speech and religion dispute that brings First Amend-
ment interests into collision, the Supreme Court forestalls substantive 
resolution by purporting to make the less momentous inquiry whether the 
relevant governmental decisionmaker has behaved neutrally toward ideas 
and speakers, faiths and believers.  Thus, for example, the gay-lesbian 
would-be parade marchers in Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and 
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Bisexual Association206 suffered no violation of expressive freedom be-
cause the government did not restrict the content of their speech; the Na-
tive American church members in Employment Division v. Smith207 suf-
fered no violation of free exercise because the government treated them 
the same as everyone else; the Christian student group in Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia208 did suffer a violation 
of expressive freedom because the state university treated the group dif-
ferently than it treated similar organizations.  The surface of virtually 
every First Amendment collision case strongly conveys the message that 
the Court need only determine whether or not the government has treated 
opposing parties and interests neutrally.   
Neutrality, of course, is a prominent trope in both free speech and re-
ligious freedom doctrine.  The central question in the Court’s free speech 
analysis is whether a challenged regulation is neutral as to the content of 
speech.209  Neutrality is one of two ever-contending models – separation 
is its opposite number – for the Court’s Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence,210 while Free Exercise Clause doctrine has come to focus almost 
completely on neutral treatment of religious beliefs and believers.211  
Numerous commentators have emphasized how the Court’s focus on neu-
trality has hampered its First Amendment decisions on free speech212 and 
religion.213  Even so, an emphasis on neutrality seems intuitively desir-
  
 206 515 U.S. 557 (1995), discussed supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. 
 207 494 U.S. 872 (1990), discussed supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text. 
 208 515 U.S. 819 (1995), discussed supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 209 See, e.g., Chicago Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (holding that 
regulating speech “in terms of subject matter . . . is never permitted”). 
 210 Compare, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (holding that Estab-
lishment Clause “requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers”) with Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (holding that 
the “first and most immediate purpose [of the Establishment Clause] rested on the belief 
that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade relig-
ion”).  See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). 
 211 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) 
(striking down local animal cruelty ordinance whose prohibitions specifically targeted reli-
gious group). 
 212 Recent critiques of neutrality as a central feature of free speech doctrine include 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Prob-
lems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49 (2000) (criticizing several 
applications of content neutrality principle); John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 1103 (2005) (arguing that Court should subordinate content neutrality principle to 
goal of promoting public debate); Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the 
Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 647 (2002) (arguing that content neutrality principle should not bar limitations on speech 
that violates the rights of others). 
 213 Recent critiques of neutrality as a central feature of Establishment Clause doctrine 
include Steven K. Green, Of (Un)Equal Jurisprudential Pedigree: Rectifying the Imbalance 
Between Neutrality and Separation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1111 (2002) (arguing that Court should 
emphasize separation and limit neutrality to an adjunct role); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny 
Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Estab-
lishment Clause, 38 GA. L. REV. 489 (2004) (criticizing Court’s increasing reliance on neu-
trality in Establishment Clause cases because neutrality does not exist); Keith Werhan, 
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able in cases of colliding First Amendment interests, because those cases 
present the Court with a conflict between constitutional principles as to 
which any decisive resolution might appear undesirably biased. 
The Court in the First Amendment collision cases therefore seeks to 
ensure governmental neutrality by employing techniques that it holds out 
as neutral principles of decision: denial and deference.214   In each case of 
a First Amendment collision, however, reliance on those techniques sub-
merges one or both of two deeply rooted First Amendment interests – 
autonomy or access, free exercise or nonestablishment.  As my discussion 
will demonstrate, the Court’s approach fails on two levels.  The Justices’ 
use of denial and deference undermines their commitment to neutrality in 
resolving First Amendment collisions, and that commitment to neutrality 
betrays their responsibility to interpret and enforce the First Amendment.  
 
1.  Neutrality in Expressive Access Cases 
 
The Court’s primary approach to collisions between expressive 
autonomy and expressive access interests is to deny that the First 
Amendment provides any basis for expressive access claims.  The Court 
builds this denial on two primary rhetorical supports: a rigid account of 
the public-private distinction and a singular focus on maintaining expres-
sive autonomy to the exclusion of any other expressive interest.  The 
Court places these two elements squarely in the foreground of decisions 
that deny the existence of expressive access interests.  What the two ele-
ments share is their strong resonance with a narrative of neutrality – the 
idea that a principled court is simply instructing the government to treat 
different speakers and viewpoints in an unbiased manner.  The Court pre-
sents both its account of the public-private distinction and its fixation on 
expressive autonomy as if they are objectively necessary ingredients of a 
neutral First Amendment analysis.  In fact, both positions reflect strong 
and consequential normative choices.  Likewise, where legislative provi-
sions for expressive access cause the Court to retreat into deference, its 
seemingly neutral respect for legislative discretion serves to avert closer 
scrutiny of its denial of a constitutional access interest. 
The Court prominently invokes the distinction between private consti-
tutional rights and public constitutional obligations as a basis for denying 
that the First Amendment supports any interest in access to the means of 
expression.  In CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,215 a plural-
ity of the Court dismissed political activists’ demand to buy advertising 
on national broadcast networks as an improper effort to impose constitu-
  
Navigating the New Neutrality: School Vouchers, the Pledge, and the Limits of a Purposive 
Establishment Clause, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 603 (2003) (criticizing Court’s oscillation between 
“substantive” and “purposive” neutrality). 
 214 The classic argument for the value of neutral decisional principles is Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
 215 412 U.S. 94 (1973), discussed supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
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tional constraints on private editorial judgment.  The Court in Hurley v. 
Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Association216 treated a gay 
organization’s plea for access to a prominent community event as an as-
sertion of legislative antidiscrimination policy against the private parade 
organizers’ choice of which perspectives to present.  Invoking the public-
private distinction to delegitimize expressive access claims allows the 
Court, on the surface, to avoid making substantive judgments about the 
relative values of competing speakers and ideas.  Public authorities’ obli-
gation to respect private speakers’ prerogatives makes for a comfortingly 
linear and value-neutral narrative.  That narrative, however, ignores the 
government’s essential role in creating and sustaining private preroga-
tives, and it stacks the rhetorical deck by holding out a formal distinction 
in status as a proxy for actual differences in power.  The incongruous 
result is a legal regime that falls over itself to protect an enormous, pub-
licly licensed broadcasting corporation and the publicly sanctioned organ-
izers of a dominant ethnic group’s most renowned urban spectacle from 
political dissidents and sexual pariahs.  The Court’s rigid application of 
the public-private distinction to expressive access disputes goes far be-
yond the laudable aim of protecting individuals’ expressive integrity to 
shield powerful institutions’ expressive resources against distributional 
challenges.  The substantive effect is to favor established wisdom over 
unruly dissent.217 
The Court’s other basis for denying a First Amendment interest in ex-
pressive access is its overriding emphasis on autonomy as a free speech 
value.  In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,218 the Court treated a 
media corporation’s editorial discretion as an especially potent instance 
of expressive autonomy and made clear that the autonomy interest left no 
room in the First Amendment for access interests.219  In Pacific Gas and 
Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,220 the Court treated the pub-
lic’s interest in information about utility issues as a mere outgrowth of the 
utility’s interest in controlling the content of its billing envelopes, dis-
missing political dissenters’ efforts to add information to the envelopes as 
an attempt to impose a species of censorship.  Likewise, Buckley v. 
Valeo221 rejected controls on political expenditures as improper con-
  
 216 515 U.S. 557 (1995), discussed supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. 
 217 I develop this critique of the public-private distinction more thoroughly, and apply it 
in the particular context of nongovernmental censorship of wartime dissent, in Gregory P. 
Magarian, The First Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental 
Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 135-51 (2004) [herein-
after Magarian, Public-Private Distinction]. 
 218 418 U.S. 241 (1974), discussed supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. 
 219 The Court in a subsequent case went so far as to invoke the primacy of editorial 
autonomy in spite of the public-private distinction, using a particularly narrow conception 
of the public forum doctrine to protect a public broadcaster from the obligation to articulate 
objective standards for excluding a minor-party political candidate from a televised electoral 
debate.  See Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 220 475 U.S. 1 (1986), discussed supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text. 
 221 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), discussed supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
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straints on the autonomy of well-financed speakers.  The Court’s fixation 
on autonomy, like its reliance on the public-private distinction, creates an 
image of governmental and judicial neutrality.  What, these decisions ask, 
could be more neutral than letting speakers speak, or more improperly 
biased than forcing them to bear the din of opposing speakers?  In the 
Court’s portrayal, expressive autonomy facilitates valuable expression by 
those who have earned the right to participate in public debate, while 
constitutional claims for access seek to poach legitimate speakers’ ex-
pressive autonomy.  Once again, however, this picture of neutrality dis-
guises a more complicated, normatively charged choice.222  Single-
minded emphasis on autonomy favors the expressive haves over the have-
nots.  No one who already possesses expressive resources needs to claim 
an interest in access to those resources, and no one who lacks expressive 
resources has any basis for claiming an interest in expressive autonomy.  
Even more problematic for First Amendment doctrine, a bias toward es-
tablished speakers tends to yield a bias toward established viewpoints. 
In relying on the public-private distinction and reifying the value of 
expressive autonomy, the Justices might be acting upon substantively 
defensible judgments.  Perhaps they believe a formalist version of the 
public-private distinction will usually assign rights and impose obliga-
tions in a manner that comports with the best understanding of constitu-
tional expressive freedom.223  Perhaps their emphasis on expressive 
autonomy to the total exclusion of expressive access reflects a theory of 
rights that takes access interests into account and finds them philosophi-
cally wanting.224  Such bases for the Court’s positions would at least en-
able a normative justification for denying the existence of a First 
Amendment interest in expressive access.  Unfortunately, the Court has 
made no substantial effort to defend its conception of the public-private 
distinction or its exclusive embrace of expressive autonomy, on those or 
any other grounds.  Instead, the Court’s decisions simply invoke these 
normative preferences as if they were organic, unassailable components 
of a substantively neutral free speech doctrine.  That sleight of hand ob-
  
 222 The Court itself has at times declared that expressive freedom means more than 
just expressive autonomy.  See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964) (emphasizing “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”). 
 223 Exemplars of this sort of argument include Julian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, 
Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There Comes 
a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (1998); Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual 
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1125-28 (1993); 
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 979-82 (1995).  
For a critical response, see Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note 217, at 135-50. 
 224 Exemplars of this sort of argument include Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997); Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. 
Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values 
and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083 (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dis-
crimination, Distribution, and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1995).  For a critical re-
sponse, see Magarian, Access Rights, supra note 6, at [24-29]. 
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scures the access decisions’ inherent slant toward status quo distributions 
of expressive opportunities.  As such, the Court’s reliance on the public-
private distinction and preoccupation with expressive autonomy foment 
doctrinal confusion and even create the capacity for engineering preferred 
outcomes under cover of purportedly neutral principles. 
Discretionary government regulations to expand expressive access, as 
seen in such cases as PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins225 and CBS, 
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,226 put the Court in a diffi-
cult position.  If the Justices asserted expressive autonomy as a constitu-
tional value to trump regulatory access initiatives, they would have to 
provide some substantive resolution of the conflict between the compet-
ing interests.  They could not simply ignore the expressive access interest, 
because the government’s regulatory initiative imbues the interest with 
salience.  Conversely, the Court’s denial of First Amendment expressive 
access interests precludes it from validating the government’s action on 
constitutional grounds.  The path of least resistance, charted in the 
Court’s decisions, is to defer the determination whether and to what ex-
tent access interests compromise autonomy interests to legislative discre-
tion, effectively pretending the constitutional problem does not exist.  
The Court attempts to justify its deference to legislative access initiatives 
through narrow, context-specific diminutions of expressive autonomy 
interests – the interest in excluding certain speakers from shopping areas 
open to the public; the interest in discriminating against political candi-
dates in the sale of advertising.  Unfortunately, the Court elsewhere rec-
ognizes precisely those interests as exemplars of its ordinary, robust ac-
count of expressive autonomy.227  Thus, the Court’s deference, designed 
to reinforce an image of principled neutrality, underscores the normative 
bias inherent in the Court’s denial of expressive access interests. 
 
2.  Neutrality in Religious Accommodation Cases 
 
In the religious accommodation context, as in the expressive access 
context, the Supreme Court defines the government’s obligation in terms 
of neutrality.  The Court employs neutrality rhetoric much more directly 
in the accommodation cases, routinely claiming that its outcomes pre-
serve neutral treatment of beliefs and believers.  The path to the Court’s 
own purportedly neutral approach toward accommodation claims has 
taken more complicated turns than in the speech setting.  Earlier religious 
accommodation decisions variously invoked the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Establishment Clause as servants of neutrality, always denying or 
  
 225 447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
 226 453 U.S. 367 (1981), discussed supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
 227 Compare PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74, with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), 
discussed supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text; CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, with CBS, 
Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), discussed supra notes 47-51 and ac-
companying text 
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ignoring the opposite, competing First Amendment interest.  Then, in a 
dual progression that culminated in Employment Division v. Smith,228 the 
Court settled on deference to elected officials as its mechanism for pro-
jecting neutrality.  The textual grounding of both free exercise and non-
establishment interests animates the Court’s choice of deference over 
denial in the religion setting, and deference sends a bold, simple message 
of judicial neutrality.  As in the expressive access setting, however, the 
Court’s failure to resolve First Amendment collisions yields normatively 
biased consequences, undermining the interests of minority religious be-
lievers while eroding restraints against government favoritism toward 
religion generally.    
The ubiquity of neutrality rhetoric in religious accommodation cases 
belies the conceptual difficulty of figuring out what neutrality means 
when a religious believer tells a court that only treating her differently 
from nonbelievers can vindicate her constitutional rights.  In the series of 
mandatory accommodation cases that began with Sherbert v. Verner,229 
the Court initially posited a strong reading of the Free Exercise Clause as 
a necessary element of government neutrality toward religion.  Without 
mandatory accommodations, the Court reasoned in the Sherbert line of 
unemployment benefits cases230 and in Wisconsin v. Yoder,231 religious 
believers suffer a special burden, because their constitutionally guaran-
teed right to worship puts them at odds with the law in a distinctive way.  
As the Court advanced its view of free exercise neutrality, it necessarily 
ignored the question whether mandatory accommodations might raise 
establishment concerns and thus violate a different sense of neutrality.  
Over time, however, the Sherbert view of neutrality eroded to nothing-
ness.  In a range of decisions that rejected mandatory accommodation 
claims,232 the Court directly retreated from the view that neutrality re-
quired a proactive view of the Free Exercise Clause.  In permissive ac-
commodation cases the Court at most ignored the Free Exercise Clause; 
at worst, in the decisions that struck down permissive accommodations, 
the Court aggressively denied the salience of free exercise considera-
tions.233  Taken together, the post-Sherbert accommodation cases trace a 
trajectory from a confident view that the Free Exercise Clause serves neu-
trality to a deep sense of skepticism whether constitutionally mandated 
legal exemptions can ever comport with a proper view of neutrality. 
In a counterintuitive parallel, the Court’s approach to the seemingly 
antithetical Establishment Clause dimension of the religious accommoda-
tion cases displays the same trajectory from assertiveness to skepticism.  
  
 228 494 U.S. 872 (1990), discussed supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text. 
 229 374 U.S. 398 (1963), discussed supra notes 101-109 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra notes 101-113 and accompanying text. 
 231 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra notes 119-136 and accompanying text. 
 233 See supra notes 151-161 and accompanying text. 
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The decisions that struck down permissive accommodations under a 
strong reading of the Establishment Clause held out a strong nonestab-
lishment principle as the helpmate of neutrality as confidently as the 
Sherbert line had assigned the same value to a strong free exercise princi-
ple.  They maintained that relieving certain religious believers of legal 
burdens that everyone else must bear flouts government’s obligation to 
treat believers of all faiths, and perhaps even nonbelievers, the same.  
Mirroring the strong free exercise decisions’ disdain for the Establish-
ment Clause, the Court’s assertions of a strong Establishment Clause con-
straint on permissive accommodations necessarily denied or disregarded 
the notion of a constitutionally salient free exercise interest.  Most com-
monly, however, the Court in religious accommodation cases came to 
view the Establishment Clause as an impediment rather than an aid to 
neutrality.  The Court rejected Establishment Clause arguments when it 
upheld permissive accommodations in the name of neutrality in Walz v. 
Tax Commission234 and Church of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos.235  Over 
a wide range of mandatory accommodation decisions, the Court treated 
the Establishment Clause as utterly irrelevant.  The Sherbert line of suc-
cessful mandatory accommodation cases flatly denied any salience of the 
Establishment Clause; more damningly, even as the Court in the 1980s 
found numerous reasons to reject mandatory accommodation claims,236 it 
steadfastly refused to find any role for the Establishment Clause.  As with 
the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s quest for neutrality in religious ac-
commodation cases left the Establishment Clause behind.237 
In both their free exercise and nonestablishment dimensions, the 
Court’s religious accommodation decisions before 1990 oscillated wildly 
in their understandings of what governmental neutrality toward religion 
required.  In addition, the Court’s frequent denial of either free exercise 
or nonestablishment interests ran aground on the plain language of the 
First Amendment.  Responding to these problems, Employment Division 
v. Smith238 abandoned all efforts to secure neutrality by asserting one 
First Amendment principle while denying the other, opting instead for 
total deference to legislative discretion all but the most extreme accom-
  
 234 397 U.S. 664 (1970), discussed supra notes 137-144 and accompanying text. 
 235 483 U.S. 327 (1987), discussed supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. 
 236 See supra notes 119-136 and accompanying text. 
 237 The Court’s progression on the Establishment Clause side of the religious accommo-
dation cases does not follow the neat chronology found on the Free Exercise Clause side.  
The idea of neutrality, however, has played a prominent role in a much broader set of Es-
tablishment Clause cases than merely religious accommodation cases, and the Court over 
the past three decades has moved inexorably toward the view that greater allowance for 
government support of religion serves neutrality under the Establishment Clause.  See, e.g., 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding publicly financed school voucher 
program under principle of government neutrality toward religion).  Read against that 
background, the Court’s treatment of nonestablishment interests in the religious accommo-
dation cases tracks its treatment of free exercise interests in moving from assertiveness to 
deference in the name of neutrality. 
 238 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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modation scenarios.  Smith told elected officials that the Religion Clauses 
placed few if any barriers in the way of handling appeals for accommoda-
tions in whatever way any political majority found desirable.  This ap-
proach replaced the earlier decisions’ tangled pathways toward an elusive 
ideal of governmental neutrality with a meta-narrative of judicial neutral-
ity.239  Smith allows the Court to claim immunity both from the danger 
that particular claimants’ free exercise appeals will lead it to give reli-
gious believers benefits that nonbelievers might also desire and deserve 
and from the danger that aggressive appeals to nonestablishment princi-
ples will cause it to undermine religious liberty by taking a cramped view 
of permissible accommodations.  Smith guarantees neutral outcomes by 
making neutrality mean whatever elected officials decide it means. 
Combining a Free Exercise Clause that does nothing to guarantee re-
ligious exemptions with an Establishment Clause that does almost noth-
ing to prevent them has produced a legal regime that strongly favors the 
interests of politically powerful religious institutions.  Since 1989, Con-
gress alone has enacted more than 200 religious exemptions, covering 
topics as diverse as land use restrictions, employment discrimination, and 
tax liability, while federal agencies and state legislatures have enacted 
countless others.240  Smith thus has provided an enormous windfall for 
religious entities that own substantial property, engage in significant 
commercial activity, and face major tax liability – primarily large, institu-
tional Christian churches.  This state of affairs presents two constitutional 
problems.  First, it reflects the political majority’s propensity to privilege 
religious beliefs over functionally equivalent nonreligious commitments 
of conscience.241  Second, in Stephen Carter’s apt summary, “what we are 
bold to call neutrality means in practice that big religions win and small 
religions lose.”242  Marginal religious believers – splinter or fledgling 
churches, groups whose belief systems resist institutional organization, 
and idiosyncratic believers with no church affiliation – gain little or no 
benefit from the institutionally focused accommodations that have fol-
lowed Smith.  Religious outliers have found episodic success in compro-
mising with the political majority to secure particular accommodations,243 
and all believers can avail themselves of general statutory exemptions 
  
 239 See id. at 890 (asserting that political disadvantaging of minority religions under a 
discretionary accommodation regime “must be preferred to a system . . . in which judges 
weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.”). 
 240 See Henriques, supra note 174, at A1. 
 241 See generally Lisa S. Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1007 (2001); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of 
Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1245 (1994). 
 242 Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice 
Brennan, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1059, 1063 (1999). 
 243 See Jesse H. Choper, Comments on Stephen Carter’s Lecture, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 
1089-90 (1999) (discussing instances of specific accommodations for minority religions).  
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such as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).244  Even general 
exemptions, however, primarily manifest the perspectives and influence 
of the Christian majority,245 and in general minority believers benefit only 
modestly from a majoritarian system that predictably favors the major-
ity’s interests.246  The Court prior to Smith certainly failed to resolve 
these problems of favoritism, but the mass of elected officials whom 
Smith emboldened have made no effort to address them. 
As in the expressive access context, the Court’s deconstitutionaliza-
tion of religious accommodation might conceivably reflect a considered, 
normative judgment.  Thoughtful commentators have argued that, on a 
proper understanding, the Establishment Clause does nothing more in the 
religious accommodation setting than buttress the Free Exercise Clause 
mandate that government stay out of religious believers’ way.247  How-
ever, even if we accept that argument’s normative orientation and look 
past its incompatibility with any notion of constitutional evolution, the 
Court has never embraced it.  Indeed, the Smith Court provided no ac-
count at all of how and why the Establishment Clause does or does not 
impact accommodation cases.  On the free exercise side, the Court has 
posited a substantive distinction between discrimination against religion 
and mere nonaccommodation.248  That distinction, however, works only 
from the perspective of the government.  Legal burdens on free exercise 
fall just as heavily on the burdened believer whether they result from dis-
criminatory animus or administrative convenience.  Thus, the distinction 
requires a normative defense of the Court’s choice of perspective, and all 
Smith offers is a broadly stated alarm of looming anarchy and a critique 
of past decisions’ assertedly incurable practical failings.  Once again, the 
Court treats a contestable doctrinal choice with strong normative conse-
quences as if it emerged organically and neutrally from the Constitution. 
 
 
 
3.  Neutrality in Religious Speech Cases 
  
 244 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).  Dean Choper holds out the passage of 
RFRA as the strongest evidence of the Smith neutrality regime’s benefits for minority relig-
ions.  See Choper, supra note 243, at 1091.  RFRA and its state equivalents, however, 
merely demonstrate necessary legislative nondiscrimination against minority religions in a 
general scheme that primarily benefits Christian churches.  Moreover, the fact that RFRA 
statutes operate through a judicial mechanism – requiring heightened scrutiny of accom-
modation claims – underscores legislators’ inattention to religious believers’ specific needs.  
 245 See Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square: Making Democracy Safe for 
Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 499, 507-16 (1998) (discussing differences between 
Christianity and Judaism that make religious accommodation more salient to Christians). 
 246 See McConnell, Revisionism, supra note 168, at 1130-36 (criticizing majoritarian 
bias of Smith); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.CHI. L. REV. 
195, 216 (1992) (contending that Smith exchanges judicial recourse more useful to minori-
ties than to majority for legislative recourse more accessible to majority than to minorities) 
[hereinafter Sullivan, Religion]. 
 247 See generally Laycock, supra note 210; McConnell, Update, supra note 98. 
 248 See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text. 
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The Court’s account of neutrality in the religious speech cases hy-
bridizes its understandings of how the two First Amendment interests that 
collide in those cases – expressive autonomy and the nonestablishment 
principle – operate in their respective native settings of expressive access 
and religious accommodation.  The expressive access cases declare that 
the Court considers expressive autonomy sufficiently central to free 
speech protection that the First Amendment has no room for any right of 
expressive access.249  The religious accommodation cases minimize the 
importance of establishment concerns, broadly licensing substantial gov-
ernment support for religious institutions.250  Given those positions, the 
Court in the religious speech cases inevitably portrays the primacy of 
religious speakers’ expressive autonomy over the government’s Estab-
lishment Clause concerns as definitive of neutral outcomes.  As Justice 
Kennedy declared in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University 
of Virginia,251 “the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, 
when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, 
extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including 
religious ones, are broad and diverse.”252 
The distinctive factual settings of the religious speech cases preclude 
the sort of broad conclusion I have reached in the expressive access and 
religious accommodation settings about the normative consequences of 
the Court’s view of neutrality.  Religious groups – all of them Christian – 
prevailed in each case, but those consistent outcomes might simply follow 
from the consistency of the cases’ fact patterns.  The Court’s view of neu-
trality in the religious speech cases, however, reflects a decision against 
an alternative course of action that would have produced opposite results.  
The Justices could have followed their approach from the expressive ac-
cess setting by deferring to legislative discretion where the government 
decided to subordinate expressive autonomy to a competing First 
Amendment interest.  That approach would have fit more comfortably in 
the religious speech cases, where the government invoked an interest with 
undeniable constitutional salience, than in the expressive access cases, 
where the Court deferred to the government’s solicitude for an expressive 
access interest whose First Amendment pedigree the Court itself had 
flatly denied.253  That the religious speech cases nonetheless opt for de-
nial over deference at least raises the possibility that here, as in the other 
First Amendment collision settings, the Court’s projection of neutrality 
obscures a normative bias: in this context, a preference for enhancing 
religious speakers’ prominence and influence in public discourse. 
  
 249 See supra notes 218-222 and accompanying text. 
 250 See supra notes 234-237 and accompanying text. 
 251 515 U.S. 819 (1995), discussed supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 252 Id. at 819.  
 253 See supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text. 
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4.  The Troubling Allure of Neutrality 
 
The Court in First Amendment collision cases purports to apply neu-
tral principles of decision, but the results it reaches consistently advance 
particular normative values.  In expressive access cases, the Court’s per-
sistent denial of any First Amendment grounding for access interests de-
pends on a rigid account of the public-private distinction and a single-
minded focus on individual autonomy.  The resulting jurisprudence safe-
guards the expressive prerogatives of wealthy and powerful speakers 
while disregarding the interests of underfunded and dissident speakers.  
In religious accommodation cases, the extreme deference of Smith throws 
aside both the free exercise interests of believers in religions unfamiliar 
or distasteful to the majority and the nonestablishment interests of anyone 
troubled by exempting religious believers from generally applicable legal 
obligations.  The resulting state of affairs allows political majorities to 
favor and disfavor religious practices at will.  In religious speech cases, 
the Court combines its extreme solicitude for expressive autonomy with 
its view that the Establishment Clause places little or no constraint on 
religious claims to public resources.  The apparent consequence is a 
stronger platform for religious speakers in public debate. 
Whatever the subjective appeal or offense of the normative slants in 
the Court’s decisions, they belie its commitment to deciding cases in a 
neutral manner.  If the Justices want us to believe that a neutral jurispru-
dence always favors established speakers and majoritarian religious insti-
tutions, they must at least defend their analyses in a way that reconciles 
those consistent results with some account of neutrality.  Not one of the 
First Amendment collision cases, however, offers any such defense.  That 
deficit of theory betrays the ultimate problem at the heart of the Court’s 
approach.  Even if the aspiration toward neutrality generated results that 
did not correspond with any normative preference, it would still drag the 
First Amendment down a blind alley.  Neutrality means nothing without a 
baseline, but the presence of any baseline countermands neutrality.254  
Neutrality thus describes an essentially futile goal for resolving serious 
conflicts. 
The Court’s fixation on neutrality in the face of First Amendment col-
lisions appears rooted in an excessive concern with judicial restraint.255  
  
 254 See Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference to 
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5-13 (1992) (criticizing pre-
vailing idea of neutrality in constitutional law as dependent on prepolitical distributions of 
resources that reflect normative biases); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: 
A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 804-24 (1983) 
(arguing that legal principles cannot be neutral because they necessarily reflect social prac-
tices). 
 255 The Seventh Circuit, in rejecting an unsuccessful patronage job seeker’s challenge 
to a state party official’s backing of a rival job candidate, has stated this concern explicitly:  
[W]e do not believe . . . that it is for us to establish a hierarchy of First 
Amendment rights by granting one First Amendment remedy that deni-
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That concern reflects our legal culture’s ongoing obsession with the coun-
termajoritarian difficulty – the supposed incongruity of unelected judges’ 
overriding elected officials’ policy choices.256  By pursuing a neutral ju-
risprudence, the Court seeks to assuage the concern that its power to hold 
legislative policy judgments unconstitutional will usurp democratic au-
thority.257  That concern does not usually deter the Court from vigorous 
enforcement of the First Amendment in straightforward cases of govern-
ment censorship, discrimination against religion, or patronage of religion.  
Unlike those scenarios, however, First Amendment collisions pit constitu-
tional interests against one another, denying the Court the rhetorical clar-
ity of a constitutional trump.258  The Court responds to this difficulty by 
employing denial and deference to maintain a posture of restraint.  Denial 
obviates the need to choose between constitutional values by leaving only 
one constitutional value extant or salient to the case.  Although the 
Court’s determination that the First Amendment contains no right to ex-
pressive access manifests a highly subjective constitutional judgment, the 
rhetoric of denial allows the Court to present that judgment as a neutral 
insight that the right simply does not exist.  Deference directly subordi-
nates the Court’s decisional authority to the elected branches’ discretion, 
although the Court’s decisions about when to defer may substantially 
channel the effects of that discretion.259   
Even aside from any normative bias it might obscure, the problem 
with the Court’s reticence to review First Amendment collisions is that it 
marginalizes the First Amendment as a check on majoritarian caprice and 
  
grates another First Amendment right.  The machinery of the courts 
may not be invoked to protect one First Amendment right at the expense 
of the other. 
Tarpley v. Keistler, 188 F.3d 788, 796 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999). 
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 257 Justice Frankfurter, in explaining his vote to affirm convictions for teaching Com-
munist doctrine, addressed this concern directly: 
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legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to 
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Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring in the 
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THEORIES OF RIGHTS (1984). 
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a guarantor of robust democratic discourse.  Concerns about judicial sub-
jectivity should not preclude substantive judicial enforcement of the First 
Amendment.  Neutrality should not crowd out democratic dynamism.  To 
the extent First Amendment collisions require the Court to make value 
judgments, it must root its judgments in broadly accepted values, articu-
late those values, and defend its judgments forthrightly.  It must develop 
a basis for substantively adjudicating collisions of First Amendment in-
terests that the people and the other branches and levels of government 
can embrace as democratically legitimate.260  It must ensure that its ap-
proach to First Amendment collisions keeps faith with democracy, both 
by respecting the proper authority of elected officials and by vigorously 
enforcing the First Amendment.  The final section of this article contends 
that the Court can meet this challenge by asking, as to each case of collid-
ing First Amendment interests, one central question: Which competing 
interest, if it prevails in the circumstances of the case, will go farther to-
ward advancing participation in the institutions and processes of democ-
ratic self-government? 
 
B.  Participation Enhancing review as a Constitutional Basis for  
 Resolving First Amendment Collisions 
 
This final section proposes a basis for substantive constitutional adju-
dication of cases that present colliding First Amendment interests.  The 
starting point for my prescription is the theory of representation reinforc-
ing review, which anchors judicial review in the dictates of democracy in 
order to justify the sort of assertive constitutional judging that the Court 
in First Amendment collision cases has worked so hard to avoid.  Limita-
tions of classic representation reinforcing review prevent it from support-
ing adjudication of First Amendment collisions.  Those limitations fall 
away, however, if we modify the theory of representation reinforcement 
by taking a substantive rather than merely formal view of what meaning-
ful participation in democratic processes entails.  The substantive partici-
pation value gives constitutional priority to enhancing the informative 
and inclusive dimensions of democratic discourse, and it can thus animate 
judicial review of the First Amendment collision cases.  The result, par-
ticipation enhancing review, gives courts a normative framework, 
grounded in widely shared democratic commitments, for resolving First 
Amendment collisions.  By offering a proceduralist solution, I do not ar-
gue that countermajoritarian concerns should limit judicial review to 
process corrections.261  I simply propose a basis for substantively resolv-
  
 260 Although my formulation of participation enhancing review addresses the Court’s 
countermajoritarian concern about substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions, 
the people’s demonstrated ability to affect the shape of constitutional judicial review over 
time should form part of the context for assessing that concern.  See generally Barry Fried-
man, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003). 
 261 Three important insights challenge the premises of procedural theories of judicial 
review: that legislatures do not reflect the people’s will to the extent procedural theories 
 
 Colliding First Amendment Interests 53 
ing First Amendment collisions that directly addresses the Court’s reason 
for resorting to denial and deference. 
 
1.  The Value and Limits of Representation Reinforcing Review 
 
The foregoing discussion attributed the Court’s futile pursuit of neu-
trality in adjudicating colliding First Amendment interests to our legal 
culture’s discomfort with unelected judges’ supposed encroachment on 
elected officials’ policymaking authority.  The most substantial theoreti-
cal effort to accommodate this countermajoritarian difficulty has been the 
theory of representation reinforcing judicial review, articulated by Justice 
Stone in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.262 and 
crystallized most fully by John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust.263  
The theory of representation reinforcement has two distinct elements.  
The first emerges from the Carolene Products suggestion that courts 
should not treat “legislation which restricts those political processes 
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable 
legislation”264 as presumptively constitutional.  That idea, in Ely’s elabo-
ration, justifies judicial review of certain breakdowns in the democratic 
process itself.265  The second element of representation reinforcement 
emerges from the Carolene Products suggestion that courts properly 
could invoke their constitutional authority to remedy “prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities.”266  That idea, for Ely, justifies judicial 
review, primarily under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause, of certain kinds of governmental attacks on minority groups’ in-
terests.267  The second, “minority protection” element of representation 
reinforcement arguably has been the theory’s most practically important 
contribution to our law, and it has drawn the theory’s heaviest criti-
cism.268   
The first element of representation reinforcing review, the political 
process theory, provides a starting point for validating substantive adjudi-
  
assume; that courts reflect the people’s will to a greater extent than procedural theories 
assume; and that the judicial role in our system contributes to, rather than detracts from, 
our Constitution’s conception of democracy.  I incorporate these insights to defend judicial 
enforcement of expressive access rights in Magarian, Access Rights, supra note 6, at [45-50]. 
 262 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
 263 ELY, supra note 2. 
 264 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. 
 265 See generally ELY, supra note 2, at 105-34. 
 266 Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. 
 267 See generally ELY, supra note 2, at 135-79. 
 268 See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) 
(accepting utility of “political process” element of Carolene Products but strongly critiquing 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” formulation); Michael J. Klarman, The 
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 784-88 (1991) (finding 
criticisms of Ely’s “minority protection” argument convincing while defending Ely’s “politi-
cal process” argument). 
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cation of First Amendment collisions.  The political process theory, as a 
justification for courts’ overruling elected officials’ policy choices, rests 
on the insight that our democratic system depends for its legitimacy on 
accurate representation.  Where malfunctions in the political process pro-
duce elected branches of government that do not represent the people 
accurately, then the elected branches’ authority is not truly democratic, 
and no basis exists for the concern that judicial review will override le-
gitimate democratic policymaking.269  Ely’s elaboration of the political 
process theory derived authority for judicial review from an ideal of de-
mocratic participation.270  He explained judicial remediation of proce-
dural breakdowns as proper to ensure “the opportunity to participate . . . 
in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and 
accommodated.”271  Critics immediately objected that, contrary to Ely’s 
proceduralist rhetoric, his explanation of judicial review as necessary to 
effectuate democratic participation necessarily entails a substantive value 
choice.272  Given the force of those criticisms, the best way to understand 
Ely’s foundational reliance on democratic participation is that democratic 
participation does encompass substantive values that are broadly accepted 
by the majority and/or ingrained in broadly shared constitutional under-
standings – values, in other words, that transcend the countermajoritarian 
difficulty.273   
Ely’s effort to withstand countermajoritarian objections came at the 
cost of advancing a somewhat impoverished notion of democratic partici-
pation, which I will call the formal participation value.  For Ely, the need 
to protect democratic participation excused judicial interference with leg-
islative prerogatives because participation generates effective representa-
tion.  On the most basic level, participation for Ely meant electoral en-
franchisement.  Thus, Ely’s political process theory defended the Warren 
Court’s voting rights precedents on the basis that formal disenfranchise-
ment prevented the excluded citizens from exercising political authority 
over their representatives.274   In addition, Ely recognized the importance 
of political speech as “critical to the functioning of an open and effective 
  
 269 See ELY, supra note 2, at 101-03 (advocating representation reinforcing review as 
consistent with democracy). 
 270 See id. at 74-77. 
 271 Id. at 77.   Ely also employed a different sense of democratic participation to explain 
the minority protection element of his theory.  See id. (positing that judicial authority to 
protect minorities ensures “the opportunity to participate . . . in the accommodation [politi-
cal] processes have reached”). 
 272 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional 
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1067-71 (1980) (contending that any commitment to democ-
ratic participation must draw upon substantive values to determine details of what partici-
pation means); Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John 
Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1045-48 (1980) (criticizing Ely’s ex-
planations of participation as a procedural justification for judicial review) [hereinafter M. 
Tushnet, Darkness]. 
 273 Ely himself anticipated this necessary elision.  See ELY, supra note 2, at 75 n.* 
 274 See id. at 116-25 (discussing judicial review of voting procedures). 
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democratic process.”275  Thus, Ely defended the Warren Court’s free 
speech precedents as aspects of the political process theory, on the basis 
that suppression of political speech prevented the putative speaker from 
exercising a different sort of political influence over her representa-
tives.276  Ely’s emphasis on representation, however, largely sublimates 
his account of participation.  His theory simply aims to ensure that repre-
sentatives can credibly claim to speak for all people constitutionally enti-
tled to participate in their selection.  As the critics of his proceduralist 
conception of participation charge, he never explains why, and to what 
extent, enhancing participation makes our democratic system better.277  
Ely’s resolution to avoid slippage into substantive values precludes any 
consideration of “better.”  His theory comprehends only “good enough” – 
good enough democratic participation to ensure accurate representation. 
Ely’s reliance on the formal participation value imposes important 
practical limits on his political process defense of judicial review.  Those 
limits are visible from two different angles.  First, in a formulation that 
continues to ground our understanding of representation reinforcement, 
Ely analogized his vision of appropriate constitutional judicial review to 
market correction under the antitrust laws.  “[R]ather than dictate sub-
stantive results,” he declared, courts should intervene “only when the 
‘market,’ in our case the political market, is systematically malfunction-
ing.”278  Second, Ely tied the scope of the political process theory to in-
tentional governmental meddling with the proper workings of democratic 
processes.  His account of constitutional expressive freedom, for exam-
ple, prescribes rigorous categorical review of regulations targeted at dan-
gerous or unpopular messages but leaves regulations that incidentally 
limit speech subject only to a balancing analysis whose stringency largely 
depends on the danger of their covert intent to target messages.279  These 
two limitations ultimately collapse into one: courts properly may substi-
tute their judgment about democratic processes for the judgment of the 
legislature only when a political majority has willfully leveraged its legal 
authority in order to suppress formal participation by a political minority 
– “when . . . the ins are choking off the channels of political change to 
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out.”280  Implicit in this 
approach is the corollary that only the political process itself can repair 
any asserted flaws in its own workings not caused by deliberate abuses of 
governmental authority. 
  
 275 Id. at 105. 
 276 See id. at 105-16 (discussing judicial review of speech regulations). 
 277 See Tribe, supra note 272, at 1070-72 (arguing that process-based theory requires 
substantive account of political community and political interactions); M. Tushnet, Dark-
ness, supra note 272, at 1047-48 (criticizing political process theory for providing insuffi-
cient account of relationship between participation and democracy). 
 278 Id. at 102-03. 
 279 See id. at 111-12. 
 280 Id. at 103. 
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The formal participation value’s limits prevent representation rein-
forcing review, as manifested in Ely’s political process theory, from pro-
viding a way out of the Court’s majoritarian aversion to resolving First 
Amendment collisions.  First, Ely’s approach necessarily precludes any 
account of what substantive values might guide adjudication of First 
Amendment collisions.  His version of expressive freedom does not ad-
dress the breadth and depth of political debate – the need for a system of 
free expression to bring the widest possible range of perspectives and 
participants into public discourse.281  About the Religion Clauses he says 
very little, only conceding that they embody substantive concerns282 and 
then mentioning religious freedom as an instance of minority protec-
tion.283  Second, few if any of the First Amendment collision cases in-
volve the sort of willful governmental interference with democratic proc-
esses that justify Ely’s “market corrections.”  Expressive access cases 
arise when a putative speaker complains that one, presumably unintended 
consequence of the government’s distribution of social benefits, such as 
broadcasting licenses and zoning variances, is that the recipient of those 
benefits has used the power they confer to exclude the putative speaker.  
Religious accommodation cases, by definition, involve applications to 
religious believers of neutral, generally applicable laws, or decisions to 
exempt believers from the force of such laws.  Government in the reli-
gious speech cases withholds certain resources from religious speakers, 
but it does so based on the dictates of the Establishment Clause.  None of 
these scenarios raises the sort of procedural concern on which Ely fo-
cused. 
The failure of representation reinforcing review to reach cases of col-
liding First Amendment interests appears to validate the Court’s determi-
nation to avoid substantive resolution of First Amendment collisions, 
returning us to square one.  However, a principle of decision is available 
that, like the formal participation value, embodies democratic commit-
ments sufficiently basic to alleviate concerns about judicial excesses, 
while improving on the formal participation value’s sense of democratic 
participation.  Articulating that principle requires consideration of why, 
beyond Ely’s account, we value democratic participation, and how par-
ticipation benefits from the various interests protected by the First 
Amendment. 
 
  
 281 Ely makes only one brief reference to a problem of expressive access.  In describing 
the proper balancing analysis for regulations that only incidentally suppress speech, he 
suggests that “a more serious threat should be required [to justify the regulation] when 
there is doubt that the speaker has other effective means of reaching the same audience.”  
Id. at 111. 
 282 See id. at 94. 
 283 See id. at 100 (emphasizing role of Free Exercise in protecting minority religious 
believers and comparing its function to that of Equal Protection Clause).  Ely’s only other 
allusion to the Establishment Clause also appears in his discussion of minority protection.  
See id. at 141 (discussing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)). 
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2. The Substantive Participation Value and Participation 
Enhancing Review of First Amendment Collisions 
 
The significance of First Amendment collisions for the health of our 
democratic system lies in how differences between the litigants’ partici-
patory opportunities can affect the vitality of democratic processes.  Be-
hind individuals’ formal interest in participating in selecting their repre-
sentatives stands a systemic interest in ensuring that people with a wide 
range of viewpoints and from a diverse set of social backgrounds will 
participate in debate about matters of public concern.  In contrast to Ely’s 
formal participation value, I call this systemic interest the substantive 
participation value.  Emphasis on the substance of democratic participa-
tion fosters a healthy democracy in two important ways.  First, maximiz-
ing the range of viewpoints present in public debate ensures that collec-
tive decisions about important policy questions – including but not lim-
ited to the election of representatives – will benefit from as much of soci-
ety’s accumulated wisdom (and also its informative stupidity) as possible.  
This is the informational benefit of democratic participation.  Second, 
maximizing the range of participants present in public debate – rich and 
poor, old and young, members of diverse racial, religious, and experien-
tial communities – ensures that as many people as possible will recognize 
and manifest their stakes in the collective decisions of the political com-
munity.  This is the inclusive benefit of democratic participation.  Both 
the informational and inclusive aspects of the substantive participation 
value depend on diversity in democratic participation.  These benefits 
therefore highlight the instrumental importance of expressive dissension 
and religious pluralism for a healthy democratic system.   
Cases of colliding First Amendment interests, as discussed above, do 
not fit the template of representation reinforcing review because they do 
not necessarily entail deliberate discrimination by political majorities 
against minorities.  Outcomes in colliding First Amendment cases, how-
ever, can make important differences in the informational and inclusive 
character of democratic processes.  Any claim for expressive access or 
religious accommodation seeks to alter the balance of public discourse – 
to increase the force or influence of one expressive or religious perspec-
tive at the expense of another.  We cannot rely on elected officials to re-
solve these conflicting dynamics of participation, any more than we can 
overlook the “market failures” that Ely emphasized elected officials im-
pose on representation, because the substantive participation value, like 
the formal participation value, derives from bedrock constitutional re-
quirements for our democratic system.284  Accordingly, cases in which 
  
 284 On a practical level, structural problems in our electoral system have frayed the 
lines of political accountability necessary to motivate the elected branches to advance the 
informational and inclusive benefits of democratic participation.  See Magarian, Access 
Rights, supra note 6, at [36-45]. 
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First Amendment interests collide require courts to step back from Ely’s 
focus on the integrity of democratic representation to assess a dispute’s 
impact on the quality of democratic discourse itself.285  Applying the sub-
stantive participation value to collisions of First Amendment interests 
compels courts to inquire which of the colliding interests in a given case 
better serves to advance our system’s overall interest in optimizing the 
informational and inclusive benefits of democratic discourse.  This analy-
sis defines participation enhancing review. 
Participation enhancing review applies intuitively to expressive ac-
cess cases.  A familiar tradition in First Amendment theory, exemplified 
by the work of Alexander Meiklejohn,286 identifies a healthy democratic 
process as the primary aim of speech protection.  Elsewhere I have advo-
cated a version of this approach, which I call the public rights theory of 
expressive freedom.  Theorists in the public rights tradition, most point-
edly Jerome Barron,287 have derived from this democracy-centered con-
ception of free speech a commitment to expressive access rights, or at 
least ample allowance for legislative and regulatory access reforms.288  
The Court in recent decades has almost completely abandoned the public 
rights theory in favor of an alternative I have labeled the private rights 
theory of expressive freedom, which safeguards against government inter-
ference the expressive autonomy of those who already possess the means 
to speak.289  The Court’s wholesale denial in the expressive access setting 
of First Amendment access rights, in favor of a single-minded commit-
ment to expressive autonomy, bespeaks the private rights theory’s domi-
nance.  Participation enhancing review, in contrast, would not entail any 
fundamental choice between the two theories.  A judge in a given case 
could hold, within the boundaries of participation enhancing review, that 
vindication of expressive autonomy best advanced the substantive par-
ticipation value.290  Participation enhancing review only precludes the 
Court’s present position that expressive access cases present no occasion 
for substantive constitutional adjudication, either because no First 
  
 285 In this sense, the substantive participation value offers a partial response to objec-
tions that Ely’s account of democratic participation pays insufficient attention to the norma-
tive shape participation should take.  See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
 286 See generally MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 4. 
 287 See generally BARRON, supra note 4. 
 288 On the divergence between proposals for expressive access rights and expressive 
access reforms, see Magarian, Access Rights, supra note 6, at [29-35]. 
 289 See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a “Public Rights” First 
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1980-88 (2003) (contrasting public rights theory 
with private rights theory). 
 290 Indeed, no democracy-focused free speech theory denies that expressive autonomy 
plays an important role in advancing effective democratic government.  See C. EDWIN 
BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 129-153 (2002) (discussing instrumental value of 
media autonomy under various democratically grounded conceptions of press freedom); 
Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note 217, at 151-55 (discussing role of auton-
omy in public rights theory of expressive freedom); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democ-
racy, and the First Amendment 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 284 (1991) (describing expres-
sive freedom as necessary to reconcile individual autonomy with collective self-government). 
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Amendment interest beyond autonomy exists or because elected officials, 
not judges, should decide what distribution of expressive opportunities 
comports with the First Amendment.291  
We generally view the Religion Clauses as protecting substantive 
rather than procedural interests.292  Religious accommodation cases, how-
ever, represent a legal Waterloo for those substantive interests: the ten-
sion between free exercise interests in accommodation and nonestablish-
ment concerns about accommodation has led the Court almost completely 
to foreswear constitutional adjudication.  The substantive participation 
value, while not the primary object of either religion clause, provides a 
path through the Court’s reticence.  The Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause share a role in setting normatively desirable terms 
for democratic discourse.  Religious identity and experience can go far 
toward shaping a person’s or group’s democratic participation.  Govern-
ment suppression of a given religious belief or practice, even if inadver-
tent, can marginalize religious believers by forcing them to choose be-
tween legal authority and their religious convictions, discouraging them 
from engaging with the political community.  On the other hand, special 
government solicitude for a given religious belief or practice can elevate 
the status of the beneficiaries, thereby denigrating adherents of other 
faiths and nonbelievers.  Justice O’Connor’s notion that an improper state 
endorsement of religion “sends a message to nonadherents that they are 
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompa-
nying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the 
political community”293 goes some distance toward capturing this democ-
ratic dimension of religious status.294  The substantive participation value 
would incline courts to favor egalitarian accommodations necessary to 
prevent political marginalization of religious minorities295 and idiosyn-
cratic accommodations with sufficiently narrow scope or subject matter to 
  
 291 Because expressive access cases typically involve putative speakers’ claims of access 
rights to nominally private expressive property, substantive judicial resolution that takes 
access interests into account would require altering the normative terms of the public-
private distinction.  Elsewhere I have argued that the public-private distinction should 
shield the expressive autonomy of natural persons, while courts should assess the rights 
and obligations of nongovernmental institutions based on each institution’s instrumental 
value for democratic discourse.  See Magarian, Public-Private Distinction, supra note 217, at 
146-72. 
 292 See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 272, at 1065 (characterizing Religion Clauses as 
“[p]lainly . . . substantive”). 
 293 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 294 Other efforts to understand the Religion Clauses in democratic terms include Abner 
S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993) (positing 
that the Establishment Clause excludes religious values from the political sphere while the 
Free Exercise Clause excludes political authority from the religious sphere); Sullivan, Relig-
ion, supra note 246, at 198 (contending that the religion clauses protect “religious liberty 
insofar as it is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral order”). 
 295 On the desirability and constitutional viability of egalitarian accommodations in the 
context of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 
(1994), see Magarian, RFRA, supra note 99, at 1992-95. 
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avoid or obviate the establishment danger of privileging religious status 
or belief.296  Conversely, courts under participation enhancing review 
would disfavor accommodations that benefited politically powerful insti-
tutions or enhanced political power based on religion. 
Participation enhancing review necessarily discards representation re-
inforcing review’s requirement of intentional government interference 
with democratic processes, because First Amendment collisions rarely 
reveal the fingerprints of such deliberate abuse.297  While the logic of 
representation reinforcing review does not compel the intent requirement, 
the requirement bolsters the formal participation value’s constraint on 
judicial discretion.298  That additional measure of constraint, however, 
carries a steep cost.  At the extreme, intent analysis can warp constitu-
tional doctrine beyond recognition, as in its essential contribution to the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts’ position that the Equal Protection Clause 
primarily serves to prevent racial discrimination against white people.299  
In the context of First Amendment collisions, the intent requirement 
abandons constitutional disputes to the vagaries of unstated or uncon-
scious legislative motives, whose unintended consequences play out in 
the economic market.  In the distribution of opportunities for democratic 
participation, neither legislative instinct nor market exchange produces 
random outcomes.  A majority Christian legislature – the only kind ever 
documented at the national or state level in this country – can favor 
Christian perspectives or disregard the perspectives of believers in minor-
ity faiths without the slightest ill intent.  The economic market inherently 
privileges the perspectives of wealthier speakers, a salient bias for all 
manner of important policy debates.  We should expect better than unin-
tentionally biased outcomes in disputes that implicate such matters of 
core constitutional concern as expression and religion.  The risk that 
judges, although limited by the substantive participation value, might 
nonetheless find openings for their subjective preferences is a fair price to 
pay for the guarantee that the branch charged with constitutional interpre-
tation will enforce the First Amendment in important disputes about free 
speech and religious liberty. 
Some will object to participation enhancing review’s directive that 
courts make certain qualitative assessments in the sensitive areas of 
  
 296 On the desirability and constitutional viability of idiosyncratic accommodations, 
again in the context of RFRA, see Magarian, RFRA, supra note 99, at 1995-97. 
 297 See supra notes 281-283 and accompanying text. 
 298 See Klarman, supra note 268, at 761 n.68 (acknowledging that political process 
theory can encompass racial and religious discrimination but opposing such an extension 
because “it would require courts to undertake inevitably speculative inquiries”). 
 299 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (striking down 
federal minority set-aside program as a violation of equal protection); Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630 (1993) (finding that challenge to electoral district designed to remedy discrimina-
tion against African Americans stated an equal protection cause of action).  Ely, although 
committed to the intent requirement, avoided the Court’s fallacious fixation on “reverse 
discrimination” by determining that, under the representation reinforcement theory, the 
white majority cannot discriminate against itself.  See ELY, supra note 2, at 170-71. 
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speech and religion.  Robert Post exemplifies this sort of objection in the 
distinctive context of decision rules for allocating government subsidies, 
arguing that judicial evaluation of the relative marginalization of ideas in 
public debate would be impractical at best and impermissibly content-
based at worst.300  Post is right to call attention to the practical challenges 
of evaluating social power differentials as part of constitutional adjudica-
tion and to warn against the danger of bias in making such evaluations.  I 
believe he is wrong, however, to presume that courts can coherently, let 
alone fairly, resolve conflicts rooted in power differentials through a filter 
of neutrality that obscures those differentials.301  This article has shown 
that the Court’s denial of expressive access rights and deconstitutionaliza-
tion of religious accommodation disputes has covertly yielded norma-
tively biased outcomes.  Participation enhancing review would, at worst, 
honestly and transparently assess First Amendment collisions.  In addi-
tion, I feel confident that more people would find the substantive partici-
pation value consistent with their understanding of courts as legitimate 
actors in our democratic system than the Court’s normative bias toward 
the status quo.  Even if we accept at face value the Court’s professions of 
neutrality in its approach to First Amendment collisions, its queasiness 
about assessing expressive access disputes’ and religious accommodation 
decisions’ effects on democratic participation leaves those effects to leg-
islative discretion and the social status quo.  Opponents of such judicial 
assessments offer no persuasive reason to prefer those forces to judges 
where important constitutional values hang in the balance. 
Participation enhancing review will raise a more general concern 
among originalists302 and judicial minimalists,303 two groups that strive 
against any allowance for subjectivity in constitutional adjudication.  The 
substantive participation value undeniably carries greater normative con-
tent than Ely’s formal participation value.304  It reaches beyond the basic 
structural fact of democratic representation to advance a view about the 
  
 300 See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 188-89 (1996). 
 301 Indeed, First Amendment doctrine focuses on power differentials when it takes 
special care to protect inexpensive means of expression.  See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 
870 (1997) (emphasizing, in striking down an online “indecency” ban, that Internet “pro-
vides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds”); City of Ladue 
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (indicting municipal ban on most residential signs as re-
stricting “an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication”). 
 302 See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ 
CONSTITUTION (1988). 
 303 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM AND 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999). 
 304 Others have suggested different ways in which Ely’s procedural concerns might 
flower into justifications for more robust varieties of judicial review.  See Rebecca L. Brown, 
Liberty: The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2002) (advocating judicial examination 
of public reasons for burdens on individual liberty as a species of representation reinforcing 
review); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democ-
racy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279 (2005) (proposing extension of 
representation reinforcing review based on contemporary conditions of pluralist democracy). 
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broader character of democratic discourse.  Even so, participation enhanc-
ing review proceeds from understandings about our democratic system, 
and aspirations for it, that most members of our political community 
share.  The formal participation value can underwrite judicial review 
whether one believes representatives should act as agents of their con-
stituents’ prepolitical interests or as trustees of their constituents’ politi-
cally determined interests.305  The substantive participation value likewise 
can underwrite judicial review of First Amendment collisions under either 
of the most broadly recognized normative strands in our democratic fab-
ric: liberal pluralism and civic republicanism.  The pluralist ideal places 
great emphasis on the importance of effective political confrontations 
among different interest groups’ material priorities.306  The substantive 
participation value can advance that ideal by helping to ensure that de-
mocratic processes accurately represent the variety and intensity of com-
peting preferences.  The republican ideal emphasizes the importance of 
deliberative discourse in pursuit of the common good.307  The substantive 
participation value can advance that ideal by helping to ensure that public 
deliberation encompasses every available viewpoint.  Participation en-
hancing review commits courts to show particular concern for dissident 
and minority perspectives, a commitment that comports in different ways 
with both the pluralist and republican ideals. 
Participation enhancing review, like representation reinforcing re-
view, does not dictate inevitable outcomes in particular cases.  The sali-
ence of dissent and difference for the substantive participation value nec-
essarily focuses judicial attention on the relative strength of litigants’ 
opportunities for participation in democratic discourse.  Inevitably and 
appropriately, however, different judges will take different views of what 
constitutes an underrepresented point of view or an unacceptable burden 
on a person’s or group’s ability to participate meaningfully in democratic 
discourse.  In some expressive access cases the autonomy interest will 
prevail, while in others the access interest will prevail.  Courts will grant 
some religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause while 
denying others under the Establishment Clause.  All participation enhanc-
ing review requires is for every court that confronts a collision of First 
Amendment interests to reach its result, and justify the result to the peo-
ple, in terms of the court’s own best sense of the substantive participation 
value.  Brief reexamination of an emblematic case from each broad cate-
gory of First Amendment collisions suggests how that assessment could 
work. 
The substantive participation value acknowledges our self-governing   
 305 See HANNA PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 127-31 (1967) (distinguishing 
agency and trusteeship models of representation). 
 306 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 304, at 1302-05 (suggesting that proper representa-
tion reinforcing review in speech cases should protect ability of opposing groups to associate 
for expressive purposes). 
 307 See generally Frank Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term – Foreword: Traces 
of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). 
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society’s powerful interest in opening public debate to the widest possible 
range of speakers and viewpoints, to inform the people about alternatives 
to the status quo and to give dissenters an active stake in the democratic 
process.  In Hurley v. Irish American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Asso-
ciation308 different understandings of that value could have caused either 
the parade organizers or the gay marchers to prevail under participation 
enhancing review.  Rather than denying the gay marchers’ expressive 
access interest, the analysis would begin by recognizing that both sides 
presented serious First Amendment interests.  The outcome would turn on 
which of those interests appeared less securely protected by the political 
status quo and, accordingly, which result would make democratic dis-
course more informative and inclusive.  The court might have concluded 
that the parade organizers’ exclusion of the gay marchers conveyed or 
preserved a message of traditional values, distinction between ethnic 
pride and identity politics, and/or opposition to substantive elements of 
the gay-lesbian political agenda unlikely to find comparable outlets else-
where in public debate.  On the other hand, the Court might have decided 
that the parade offered the gay marchers a unique and important platform 
from which to confront entrenched prejudice or disapproval. 
Participation enhancing review takes account of religious accommo-
dations’ value for ensuring religious believers’ ability to participate fully 
in democratic processes and also of religious accommodations’ danger for 
making religious faith a basis for undue enhancements in societal or po-
litical status.  In Employment Division v. Smith309 those considerations 
might have cut either way, but they necessarily would have precluded the 
actual Smith doctrine of radical deference.  The Native Americans who 
sought relief in Smith from the effects of Oregon’s drug laws on their 
sacramental use of peyote undeniably represented a community on the 
political and religious margins.  Accordingly, the Court under participa-
tion enhancing review would have had a strong basis for concluding that 
they needed the requested accommodation in order to maximize their en-
gagement with the political community at large, while their minority 
status and highly idiosyncratic request diminished any establishment risk 
from the accommodation.  Conversely, the Court might have rejected the 
accommodation claim, either because the choice to which Oregon’s law 
put the Native Americans did not seriously undermine their capacity for 
full participation in democratic discourse or because the accommodation 
would have deviated so powerfully from generally applicable law that, 
notwithstanding the beneficiaries’ minority status and the accommoda-
tion’s idiosyncratic character, granting it would have sent a chilling mes-
sage to nonbelievers about the political importance of religion.310 
  
 308 515 U.S. 557 (1995), discussed supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. 
 309 494 U.S. 872 (1990), discussed supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text. 
 310 Participation enhancing review would allow courts to reject religious accommoda-
tion claims based on government interests unrelated to the Establishment Clause.  In sharp 
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The religious speech cases juxtapose the substantive participation 
value’s imperative to protect dissent against its imperative to promote 
religious inclusion while avoiding undue elevation of religion.  Given 
those considerations, participation enhancing review would have focused 
the Court in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia311 on the complex interaction between the dynamics of robust pub-
lic discourse and the political salience of religious belief.  The university 
in Rosenberger denied a Christian student group an otherwise generally 
available subsidy for student publications.  The Court’s determination 
whether that exclusion undermined the substantive participation value 
would have turned on at least three axes.  First, the Court would have 
needed to fix the relevant frame of reference for assessing the university 
policy’s impact.  Christian perspectives – the subjects of all the religious 
speech cases – exert considerable influence in the United States gener-
ally, and probably greater influence in Virginia.  On the other hand, 
Christian perspectives might well be in short supply at a large state uni-
versity.  Second, the Court would have needed to consider whether the 
University’s freedom to effectuate a distinctive educational mission con-
tributed more to democratic discourse, at least in the circumstances of 
this case, than the Christian group’s ability to bring its faith to bear on 
public debate.  Finally, whereas the actual Rosenberger majority 
shrugged off the nonestablishment justification for the University’s pol-
icy, participation enhancing review would have required the Court to as-
sess carefully the shape and severity of the establishment concern.  Did 
the University’s policy simply disadvantage the Christian group relative 
to comparable organizations, or did it preserve a key barrier between the 
governmental and religious spheres? 
The foregoing examples demonstrate that participation enhancing re-
view leaves judges with substantial analytic latitude, largely due to the 
broad normative content of the substantive participation value.  The in-
quiries that the substantive participation value mandates – the particular 
standards for participation in a healthy democracy, the relative degree of 
different ideas’ or speakers’ representation in public debate, a given reli-
gious accommodation’s likely costs and benefits for democratic participa-
tion – elude easy resolution and invite some measure of subjective analy-
sis. The substantive participation value, however, carries sufficiently 
clear meaning to foreclose most normatively divisive judicial freelancing, 
and it embodies ideas about democracy that our society broadly accepts.  
Participation enhancing review serves democratic values in the same 
manner as representation reinforcing review, equipping courts with a sub-
stantive understanding of democracy and charging them with ensuring 
  
contrast to the Court’s reflexive deference under Smith, however, attention to the substan-
tive participation value would require courts to measure asserted government interests 
against a substantial conception of free exercise, in the manner of heightened constitutional 
scrutiny. 
 311 515 U.S. 819 (1995), discussed supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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that resolutions of important legal disputes reflect that understanding. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article calls on courts to do something that disturbs many people: 
apply a necessarily broad normative framework to an important class of 
constitutional disputes.  Participation enhancing review of colliding First 
Amendment interests would require judges to consider whether ruling in 
favor of this putative speaker without means or that owner of expressive 
property, this legally burdened religious practitioner or that wary nonbe-
liever, would do more to advance our society’s common interest in foster-
ing informative, inclusive democratic participation.  The theory allows 
for vindication of constitutional rights where the government has not dis-
criminated intentionally, and the legal inquiry requires subjective judg-
ment and leaves space for divergent outcomes.  Skeptics, however, should 
consider the present alternative.  The Supreme Court has demonstrated, 
relentlessly, how First Amendment collisions play out absent participa-
tion enhancing review.  Confronted with tension between two constitu-
tional interests, the Court denies that one of the interests exists or matters.  
When government regulation – or, in the case of the Religion Clauses, the 
constitutional text – renders denial untenable, the Court defers evaluation 
of the constitutional interests at stake to the elected branches.  These 
techniques of denial and deference aim to avoid excessive interference 
with elected officials’ policymaking discretion. 
The Court’s approach makes perfect sense – unless we believe de-
mocracy requires the First Amendment to supersede elected officials’ 
policymaking discretion.  If the Court’s duty to interpret the Constitution 
and impose its interpretation on disputes that implicate constitutional val-
ues extends even to cases in which First Amendment interests collide, 
then we need a theoretical basis for substantive judicial resolution of such 
cases.  The theory this article advocates, participation enhancing review, 
proceeds from the same logic that fortifies the familiar countermajori-
tarian salve of representation reinforcing review: it finds a basis for judi-
cial action in our society’s deeply ingrained understandings about the 
requirements of participatory democracy.  Where representation reinforc-
ing review defends judicial redress of governmental affronts to the politi-
cal process based on a formal participation value, participation enhancing 
review extends that defense to First Amendment collisions based on a 
substantive participation value.  The substantive participation value em-
bodies our self-governing society’s interest in informative, inclusive de-
mocratic participation.  It accordingly calls particular judicial attention to 
the importance for democratic discourse of dissent and difference. 
The present Court shows no inclination to reconsider its unduly re-
strained approach to First Amendment collisions.  My hope is that par-
ticipation enhancing review’s firm roots in our society’s widely shared 
commitment to democratic participation will make the theory appealing 
in the future.  The Constitution embodies our deepest democratic com-
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mitments, and the First Amendment’s protections of speech and religion 
stand among the most crucial of those commitments.  When legal disputes 
implicate expressive or religious interests, even if those interests clash, 
the Court should not elevate judicial restraint over substantive analysis 
through a futile pursuit of neutral decisional principles.  Instead, it should 
assertively construe and apply the Constitution’s commands.  Participa-
tion enhancing review would not fully obviate the majoritarian anxiety 
that judges, charged with implementing broadly conceived normative 
principles, might at times place their own subjective values above the will 
of the people’s representatives.  What participation enhancing review 
would guarantee is that the democratic values manifest in the First 
Amendment would control the outcomes of the important legal disputes 
in which First Amendment interests collide. 
 
